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Economic decisions are rarely now or never. In many real life situations
a third way is available to individuals: Waiting. Waiting is often an
optimal choice because it gives the opportunity to observe the evolution
of the economic environment and to take a more informed decision. The
possibility to wait and see is valuable in the presence of uncertainty and
when the decision under consideration implies consequences which are, at
least to some degree, irreversible. In nancial economics, the opportunity
to wait associated with the right but not the obligation to undertake an
action is at the basis of the notion of option. This thesis is composed
of three essays in which the option approach is used to model di¤erent
economic problems.
The rst essay, Cash and competition, studies the e¤ects of product
market competition of rmscash holdings. The second essay, Willing-
ness to wait under risk and ambiguity: Theory and experiment, examines
how risk and ambiguity inuence the optimal timing of option exercise.
The third essay, Learning investment, analyzes the optimal investment
policy in technologies that involve a process of learning by doing. The
three essays study substantially di¤erent economic problems but are re-
lated by a common theme. Agents maximize their value by choosing the
timing of an irreversible action in an uncertain environment. As it im-
mediate to understand, such common theme nds a potentially unlimited
number of applications, which are not restricted to economic problems.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
After all, the entire human existence is characterized by timing decisions
which are taken in condition of uncertainty and are to some extent irre-
versible. In the remainder of this Introduction I will present an overview
of the three essays.
The starting point of the rst essay, Cash and Competition, is one of
the most interesting facts in recent corporate nance, that is the dramatic
increase in cash holdings of US corporations in the last thirty years. The
aim of this essay is to study how and by which mechanisms the intensity of
product market competition a¤ects rmscash holdings. The motivation
for this study is that, potentially, competition has profound inuence on
rmswillingness to hold cash. The available empirical evidence shows
that the documented increase in cash was mainly driven by changes in the
business conditions and rmscharacteristics. Competition not only is one
a key determinant of the business environment but also, by triggering en-
dogenous selection mechanisms, it can indirectly shape the characteristics
of the pool of incumbent rms. Hence, the increase in competition docu-
mented in the post WWII period, is likely to have had a major impact on
the incentives to hold cash reserves.
The model studies an imperfectly competitive industry with a large
number of rms. Firms make entry, exit, and pricing decisions and choose
their optimal capital structure to exploit the tax-benets of debt. The
intensity of competition depends on the ability to set a price above the
marginal cost of production, as determined by the degree of product sub-
stitutability. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which determine
their productivity level and prots. Because of capital market imperfec-
tions, access to external nance is restricted and rms that have no means
to cover their payments are liquidated even if they are still protable in a
long-run perspective. To prevent this possibility rms hoard cash.
The solution shows that cash holdings positively depend on two com-
ponents. A cost component, represented by the discounted stream of xed
costs of production and interest payments on debt, and an option com-
ponent, which captures the option value to remain active in the market
in periods of negative protability. The solution has an intuitive inter-
pretation. Since rms use liquid asset to cover losses in bad times, cash
3
depends on both the stream of xed cost, the cost component, and on the
willingness to cover these costs with internal resources when protability
is low, the option component.
Competition a¤ects the optimal amount of cash via two contrasting
channels. First, it increases the option value to remain in the market,
and this has a upward e¤ect on cash. Second, it induces the rms to
reduce the cost component, and this has a downward e¤ect on cash. The
economic intuition is as follows. The e¤ect of competition is to decrease
expected prots and to increase volatility. With a higher volatility the
option value to remain in the market (the option component) is larger
and rms are willing to absorb greater losses prior to declaring default.
For this reason, they want to hold more cash. On the other hand, lower
expected prots and a higher volatility together increase the risk of default
inducing the rms to adopt a more debt-conservative capital structure.
Other things being equal, lower debt payments reduce the xed costs (the
cost component) and exert a downward pressure on the optimal amount
of cash reserves.
The model generates two main predictions. First, although the overall
e¤ect is potentially ambiguous, under realistic conditions cash increases
with competition. Second, there is a negative relation between cash and
debt. This happens because, when the option value to remain in the mar-
ket is large, rms have a more compelling need to increase their chances
of survival in bad times and increase their cash balance to be able to
withstand negative shocks. At the same time, rms adjust their capital
structure by reducing xed interest payments on debt to limit losses in
periods of low protability. By increasing the option value to remain in
the market, the e¤ect of competition is to exacerbate the negative rela-
tion between cash and leverage. The predictions of the model are largely
consistent with the available empirical evidence.
The second essay, Willingness to wait under risk and ambiguity: The-
ory and Experiment, studies both theoretically and experimentally the
distinct roles of two forms of uncertainty, risk and ambiguity, on the op-
timal timing of option exercise. While studies on nancial and non nan-
cial options have mainly considered uncertainty as risk, it is well known
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that risk is not the only form uncertainty encountered by individuals.
In fact, the academic literature distinguished between uncertainty with
known probabilities, known as risk, and uncertainty with unknown prob-
abilities, known as ambiguity. Experimental and theoretical studies doc-
umented the behavioral signicance of this distinction and examined its
implications in several economic settings. This second essay is the rst
attempt to predict and test, in a unifying framework, the e¤ects of risk
and ambiguity on the optimal timing of option exercise.
The rst step of this work is to develop a new theoretical model of
optimal option exercise in which both risk and ambiguity are present.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. A decision maker holds
the opportunity to invest in a project by paying a xed cost. The value
of the project grows deterministically over time but, at each instant, the
option to invest can disappear at an exogenously specied expiration rate.
If the decision maker invests before the expiry of the option, he obtains a
payo¤ equal to the current value of the project minus the investment cost,
while he gets nothing otherwise. Thus, there is a value in delaying the
investment, because the payo¤ is growing over time, but waiting involves
an opportunity cost because the investment option can vanish at instant
with positive probability. There are two possible states of the world. In
the good state, the expiration rate is low while it is high in the bad state.
The true value of the expiration rate is unknown at the initial date but
the decision maker can learn about the true state of the world. If time
progresses and the investment opportunity does not expire, the decision
maker can infer that the state of the world is more likely to be good, and
he updates his beliefs accordingly.
This setting allows distinguishing between a risky and an ambiguous
scenario. In the risky scenario, the decision maker knows the relative
probability of the expiration rate being high or low. Risk is given by the
spread between high and low expiration rates, for the expected expiration
rate being constant. In the risky scenario, the decision maker has imprecise
information about the probability of the two states of the world. He only
knows that this probability lies within a certain interval, and ambiguity
is measured by the size of probability interval. The model delivers the
following predictions. First, risk delays investment. The reason is that,
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when the spread between high and low expiration rates becomes larger,
the non expiration of the option to invest during a given time interval is a
more reliable signal that the state of the world is in fact good one. Thus,
the upside potential of the option is larger and the decision maker waits for
a higher project value before investing. The e¤ect of ambiguity depends
on the decision makers attitude towards ambiguity. If he is ambiguity
averse, investment is undertaken sooner. Since investment yields a certain
payo¤ while waiting involves an uncertain prospect, an ambiguity adverse
decision maker, who dislikes the uncertainty associated with the waiting
region, prefers to invest sooner. In contrast, an ambiguity seeking decision
maker is more willing to face uncertainty and waits longer to obtain a
larger payo¤.
The predictions of the model are tested in a laboratory experiment
through three treatments. In the rst treatment, called Benchmark, sub-
jects know the values of the high and low expiration rates and the relative
probability of the two states of the world. In the second treatment, called
Risk, the spread between the high and low expiration rates (our measure
of risk) is increased compared to Benchmark. In the third treatment,
called Ambiguity, the values for the high and low expiration rates are as
in Benchmark but subjects do not have any information about the rela-
tive probability of the two states of the world. Experimental data strongly
support the theoretical prediction about risk. In the treatment Risk, the
investment decision is delayed compared to Benchmark. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, also the investment decision in Ambiguity is delayed compared
to Benchmark. According to the model predictions, this is a sign of am-
biguity seeking. The robustness of the latter result is tested in another
treatment, called Mild Ambiguity, in which growth and expiration rates
as in Benchmark and Ambiguity but subjects have a partial information
about the relative probability of the states of the world. Data reveal that
in Mild Ambiguity investment is still delayed compared to Benchmark,
though the e¤ect is substantially weaker than in Ambiguity. Overall, we
nd a weak conrmation of an ambiguity seeking attitude.
The third and last essay, Learning Investment, studies investment
in technologies that involve a process of learning by doing. Specically, it
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investigates the optimal timing and scale of investment when demand is
uncertain and marginal costs decrease with cumulative production. The
literature on investment under uncertainty mainly focuses on the optimal
timing of investment. This essay also investigates the choice of optimal
capacity. The motivation for studying the joint determination of timing
and scale is the existence of a trade-o¤. When the scale of investment is
exible but the timing is not, the presence of the learning curve implies
that rms should invest in a larger capacity. On the other hand, when
the timing is exible but the scale is xed, the learning curve accelerates
investment. These two observations suggest that investment should occur
early and on a large scale to maximize the benet of learning. However,
investing early, that is, investing at the moment that levels of demand or
productivity are still low implies that only small scale projects are feasi-
ble. At the same time, a large scale investment typically requires higher
demand or productivity and entails a longer waiting time, so that some
prots are foregone. Therefore, an optimal investment strategy requires
nding a balance between timing and scale that allows rms to benet
from the learning curve but, at the same time, it is not too costly in the
short run.
The resolution of the timing-scale trade-o¤ depends on the steepness
of the learning curve. Under slow learning investment occurs relatively
late and on a larger scale, whereas under fast learning it occurs early and
on a smaller scale. In the latter case rms do not need large production
rates to substantially reduce marginal costs. Hence, it is optimal to invest
soon and install a small capacity. The opposite holds under slow learning,
because then optimality implies that a rm should install a larger capacity
to reduce marginal costs su¢ ciently within a given amount of time. Given
the larger project size, investment is delayed. It turns out that, where
timing is accelerated, scale is inversely U-shaped in the steepness of the
learning curve.
To take advantage of learning benets, rms may undertake learning
investments even when current revenue rates are below costs. Thus, the
optimal investment rule implies that the rm will incur losses at early
stages of production. The analysis indicates that, typically, the present
value of expected initial losses is large and is the largest for moderate learn-
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ing rates. For steep learning curves, the initial level of losses is similar but,
because of rapid learning, the break-even point is reached sooner. Third,
the losses incurred in early production stages can easily dwarf the initial
investment outlays to set up the production facility. Overall, these ndings
indicate that learning investments can be nancially very demanding for
rms. This is especially true for technologies with intermediate learning
curves.
Learning investment may be particularly exposed to downside risk.
New technologies may be superseded by newer technologies, turn out un-
marketable, or awed. To analyze how downside risk a¤ects optimal in-
vestment, we extend the model by introducing the possibility that with
positive probability an event occurs that results in the death of the project.
We show that learning investment is very sensitive to this type of risk. In-
vestment is signicantly delayed and scale increases with the occurrence
of even small levels of downside risk. In contrast, timing and scale of
non-learning investment are very insensitive to this type of risk. Further-
more, the value of investment projects with learning e¤ects is decreased
more by downside risk. Interestingly, the e¤ects on learning investment
are strong for moderate learning curves and steeper curves do not amplify
them further. The explanation is related to the initial losses associated
with learning investment, which are similar for these cases. Furthermore,
the threat that the project expires before any prots materialize, distorts





In two distinct empirical studies, Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al.
(2009) report that U.S. corporations hold substantial amounts of cash
reserves. Bates et al. (2009) also document a dramatic increase in the cash
holdings of the typical rm in the period from 1980 to 2006. Despite the
growing attention from the academic literature, explaining why rms hold
so much cash when there are other options to manage liquidity remains a
challenge for the theory of corporate nance. This work does not directly
take on this challenge but, starting from the empirical evidence that rms
do hold cash, it studies how and by which mechanisms the intensity of
product market competition a¤ects rmscash reserves.
Among the potential determinants of rmscash holdings, competition
is a natural candidate to look at. The empirical analysis of Bates et al.
(2009) reveals that the documented increase in cash was mainly driven
by changes in the business conditions and rmscharacteristics. Compe-
tition not only is per se a key aspect of the business environment but,
through endogenous selection mechanisms, it may also indirectly shape
the characteristics of the pool of surviving rms. Furthermore, several in-
dicators consistently suggest that the intensity of competition has steadily
increased in the last forty years (for example, Comin and Philippon (2005)
and Irvine and Ponti¤ (2009), among others). This fact is likely to have
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had a major impact on the incentives to hold cash reserves.
I study an industry with a large number of competitors, in which rms
are subject to individual productivity shocks and hold an option to default
whenever market conditions become unfavorable. Firms make entry, exit,
and pricing decisions and choose their optimal capital structure to exploit
the tax-benets of debt. The intensity of competition depends on the
ability to set a price above the marginal cost of production, as determined
by the degree of product substitutability. Capital markets are imperfect
and access to external nance is restricted. Firms that have no means
to cover their payments are liquidated even if protable in a long-run
perspective. To prevent this possibility, rms accumulate cash. Covering
losses to remain alive may not be the only reason why rms hold cash.
The presence of cash holdings within the rm can also be explained by
the need to nance protable investment opportunities when access to
external nance is restricted, or by agency conicts between managers
and shareholders (Jensen (1986)). The modeling choice of this work is
based on the evidence that rms mainly use cash to withstand liquidity
shortfalls in bad times (Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009) and, in
particular, Lins et al. (2010)), while both investment and agency motives
seem to be of poor empirical relevance (Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al.
(2009) and Lins et al. (2010)).
The properties of the model are investigated in the stationary industry
equilibrium. In equilibrium, there is a time-invariant distribution function
which describes the productivity of incumbent rms, and aggregate vari-
ables are endogenously determined and constant over time. In this setting,
I study the long-run e¤ects of exogenous changes in the intensity of product
market competition on the optimal amount of cash reserves. The equilib-
rium approach has two important advantages. First, it is consistent with
the idea that variations in the intensity of competition often depend on
exogenous shocks (as the removal of regulatory barriers, the reduction of
legal and administrative restrictions on entry, or the opening of new mar-
kets) which require a certain time for the rms to adjust. Second, it cap-
tures the fact that competitive pressure can a¤ect cash holdings not only
via the direct e¤ects on the business environment but also through changes
in rmscharacteristics induced by endogenous self-selection mechanisms.
10 CHAPTER 2. CASH AND COMPETITION
After solving for the industry equilibrium, I provide the expression for
the optimal amount of cash in closed-form. The solution shows that cash
holdings positively depend on two components. A cost component which
is given by the discounted stream of xed costs of production and interest
payments on debt, and an option component, which captures the value of
remaining active in the market in periods of negative protability. I show
that the e¤ect of competition is to increase prot volatility and to reduce
the expected prot for the average rm. This gives rise to two contrasting
e¤ects on cash holdings. On the one hand, higher volatility triggers the
standard real options e¤ect and increases the value of the option compo-
nent. Since the exit decision is irreversible and currently adverse market
conditions can rapidly turn positive, the option value to remain active in
the market becomes more valuable. For this reason, rms are willing to
absorb larger losses prior to declaring default and need greater amounts of
cash reserves. On the other hand, lower expected prots and higher volatil-
ity together reduce the net benets of debt inducing the rms to adopt a
more debt-conservative capital structure. Other things being equal, lower
debt payments exert a downward pressure on the cost component and tend
to reduce the optimal amount of cash reserves.
Hence, competition a¤ects the optimal amount of cash via two oppos-
ing forces. The rst is the increase in the option value to remain in the
market, which has an upward e¤ect on cash. The second works through
the reduction in the debt payments and has a downward e¤ect. Although
the overall e¤ect is potentially ambiguous, I show that, under realistic con-
ditions, cash increases with competition. In the main text, I provide some
technical explanations to motivate this nding. Here, I restrict my atten-
tion to a more general argument. In the model, rms can freely choose
their capital structure before the entry date. This means that they have
a high degree of exibility to optimally adjust their debt payments to the
expected market conditions. In reality, constrained rms may not have
such exibility. When capital markets are imperfect, a sensible reduction
in debt payments as a response to a riskier economic environment can be
di¢ cult to achieve either because access to equity nancing is more costly
than debt or because, due to the constraint itself, the original level of debt
is already low. A lack of nancial exibility impairs the functioning of the
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cost component channel and makes the upward e¤ect due to the option
component more likely to prevail. If this is the case, cash reserves are
expected to increase with the intensity of competition.
The model also predicts a negative relation between cash and debt.
This e¤ect is driven by the option component. When the value to remain
active in the market becomes larger, rms increase their cash balance to
be able to withstand negative shocks. At the same time, they adjust their
capital structure by reducing leverage. A more debt-conservative capital
structure lowers xed interest payments, reduces the risk of liquidation
and increases the probability of survival in bad times. By increasing the
option value and reducing the net benets of debt, the e¤ect of competition
is to exacerbate this negative relation.
The identied relation between competition, idiosyncratic volatility,
capital structure and cash holdings is consistent with a number of empiri-
cal facts documented in the literature. Over the time horizon investigated
by Bates et al. (2009), idiosyncratic volatility displayed a substantial
increase and was the major source of rm-level dynamics (Campbell et
al (2001), Chaney et al. (2005), Comin and Philippon (2005)). Irvine
and Ponti¤ (2009) prove that the increase in volatility is at least partly
attributable to a more intense product market competition, providing em-
pirical ground for the main channel indentied in this work. At the same
time, corporate cash holdings increased steadily and, as reported in Bates
et al. (2009), leverage for the median rm decreased sensibly over the
years.1 Consistently, Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) nd
that there exists a negative relation between cash holdings and leverage.
The model provides a theoretical foundation for bringing together these
pieces of evidence. When idiosyncratic shocks are the main source of
uncertainty, a more intense product market competition raises rm-level
volatility, increases the option value to remain in the market and rein-
forces the precautionary motive for holding cash. Also, the option value
to remain in the market can generate a negative relation between cash and
leverage.
Firmscash policy received increasing attention from the academic lit-
1However, in the sample of Bates et al. (2009), the reduction in leverage for the
average rm is less pronounced.
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erature (for example, Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009), Almeida et
al. (2004), Acharya et al. (2007) and Lins et al. (2010)). The closest work
to mine is a recent paper by Morellec and Nikolov (2011) which also ex-
amines the e¤ects of product market competition on rmscash holdings.
Their theoretical predictions suggest, and the empirical analysis conrms
that the trend in cash holdings documented by Bates et al. (2006) is
at least partly explained by a competition e¤ect. The focus of Morellec
and Nikolov (2011), however, is mainly directed to the empirical analy-
sis. This work complements their study by identifying the mechanisms
by which competition inuence cash holdings. Furthermore, it identies
in the option value to remain active in the market the key to explain the
negative relation between cash and leverage observed in the data. Another
related work is the paper by Murto and Terviö (2011), which introduces a
liquidity constraint in a dynamic exit model and characterizes the optimal
default and dividend policy. Murto and Terviö (2011) examine the steady
state equilibrium of a competitive industry and show that the liquidity
constraint not only has the direct e¤ect of imposing ine¢ cient exit but
also creates a price distortion that leads to ine¢ cient survival. Gryglewicz
(2011) studies a model with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquid-
ity shocks in which the rm simultaneously chooses cash holdings, capital
structure, dividends, and optimal default. These interactions result in a
dynamic cash policy in which the rm smoothes dividend payments while
cash reserves increase in protability and are positively correlated with
cash ows. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) also introduce credit constraints in
a real options model but they investigate a rms entry choice, in which
uncertainty does not a¤ect the ex-post investment cash-ows but only the
pre-entry availability of funds to cover investment costs. In an empiri-
cal investigation, Frésard (2010) reverses the causal link of this work and
studies the e¤ect of cash reserves on market outcomes and rmsperfor-
mance. He shows that, when competition becomes more intense, cash-rich
rms gain market shares at the expense of industry rivals.
To derive the industry equilibrium, I adapt the concept of stationary
equilibrium introduced by Hopenhayn (1992) to a dynamic stochastic ver-
sion of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. While Hopen-
hayn (1992) employs a discrete time framework, my model is in continuous
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time and is, from a methodological point of view, closer Miao (2005). Zh-
danov (2007) develops a continuous time equilibrium model to study the
relation between competition and the optimal investment and nancing
strategies. In his analysis, however, rms are subject to industry-wide un-
certainty so that the resulting equilibrium is non-stationary. Novy-Marx
(2007) also investigates a competitive model in continuous time with a
non-stationary equilibrium. Industry models in discrete time with non-
stationary equilibria include Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Abbring and
Campbell (2010).
I organize this work as follows. Section 2.2 presents the general struc-
ture of the model and describes the product and capital markets. Section
2.3 solves model while taking the capital structure as exogenous. Section
2.4 investigates the optimal capital structure model. Finally, Section 2.5
concludes. Proofs are in Appendix.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Production and demand
Time is continuous and indexed by t 2 [0;1). At each instant a represen-









Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint:Z
2
p () q () d  Y; (2.2)
where q () is the consumption of good of quality ,  is the set of varieties
produced in the industry,  2 (0; 1) is the degree of product substitutabil-
ity and Y is the exogenous expenditure, normalized to one hereafter. The
intensity of product market competition is parsimoniously captured in the
model by the elasticity of substitution between products, which is constant
and equal to  = 1=(1   ) > 1. The focus of this work is to investigate
how and by which channels an increase in competition, i.e. a rise in the
elasticity of substitution , a¤ects rmswillingness to hold liquid assets.
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As Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) show, the optimal consumption decision



















is an aggregate price index.
2.2.2 Firms
The production side is characterized by a continuum of innitesimal rms.
Each rm produces a single variety using labor as the only input for pro-
duction. Labor is inelastically supplied and is demanded in quantity




where F  0 is a xed component of labor demand common to all rms,
and  is the rm-specic productivity level. As in Melitz (2003), higher
productivity is modeled as producing a symmetric variety at lower mar-
ginal costs.
Firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity. This is
captured by the fact that  follows a geometric Brownian motion:
d t
 t
= dt+ dWt; (2.6)
where  and  are the proportional drift and volatility. Brownian shocks
are assumed to be independent across rms.
Firms set prices to maximize their own prots. Prot maximization
yields the optimal pricing rule:




where w is the common wage rate also normalized to one, hereafter. I
assume that prices can be adjusted at no costs so that (2.7) holds at every
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instant. It follows that rms generate earnings before tax and interest





 1   F: (2.8)
Future earnings are discounted at a constant rate .
Beside individual productivity shocks, rms are subject to another
source of idiosyncratic uncertainty. At every instant, rms can exit for
exogenous reasons not related to their protability. This event is modeled
as a Poisson shock with mean arrival rate . Poisson shocks are also
assumed to be independent across rms. The possibility of exogenous exit
captures in a stylized way the fact each year a number of rms abandon
their operations even if they are still protable (for example, Dunne et
al. (1988)). Furthermore, it is necessary to guarantee the existence of
a stationary equilibrium. Since the process for the productivity shock is
non-stationary, without exogenous death the number of rms with a high
productivity could grow unbounded (see also Miao (2005)).
2.2.3 Debt and default
Corporate prots are taxed at a constant rate  2 (0; 1) with full loss-o¤set
provisions. Since interest payments are tax-deductible, debt creates tax
benets and rms choose the debt-equity mix that maximizes their value.
Indicate by E the value of equity and DBT the value of debt. The total
value of the rm, denoted by V , is given by the sum of equity and debt,
V = E + DBT . Debt has innite maturity and pays a constant coupon
b. Firms can only be net borrowers, which implies that b  0. It follows
that the instantaneous prot net of taxes and interest payments equals:
 = (1  ) (EBIT   b) : (2.9)
Firms have the option to default and exit the industry. Exit is irreversible.
As I will show below, the optimal default policy is formulated as a trig-
ger strategy which prescribes that the rm should default on its obliga-
tions whenever its productivity  falls below an endogenously determined
threshold. Dene  e as the productivity level such that, if    e, it is
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optimal to remain active in the market while, if  <  e, it is optimal to
default.
In case of default, the rm is liquidated and debt-holders have absolute
priority on the productive assets. The liquidation value of the assets is a
fraction (1  ") of the value of an unlevered and unconstrained rm, where
" 2 (0; 1) is the proportional liquidation cost. The value of an unlevered
and unconstrained rm, indicated by Vu, equals the discounted stream of









where tu is the optimal abandonment time and the maximization is over
the set of possible abandonment times T . The value of equity of a levered
rm is given by the discounted stream of prots until the optimally chosen
abandonment time te,








while the value of debt is the stream of coupon payments until default
plus the present value at the abandonment time of the unconstrained and
unlevered rm,










The abandonment time te is chosen to maximize shareholdersvalue.
2.2.4 Aggregation
Call N the number of rms currently active in the market and f ( ) the
distribution of the productivity levels of those rms. Since the productiv-
ity shock follows (2.6) and rms voluntarily exit when  falls below  e, the
distribution f ( ) is dened over the interval [ e;1). Using the denition
















is the weighted average productivity of the incumbent rms. Substituting
(2.13) in (2.8), and using (2.9), yields the following expression for the
per-period prot:








  F   b
#
: (2.15)
Notice that  depends on the relative strength of the rm in the mar-
ket, given by the ratio between the idiosyncratic productivity  and the
industry average productivity  A.
The model is investigated in the long-run stationary equilibrium in
which the industry-wide variables N and  A (and therefore P ) are con-
stant over time. As in Miao (2005), a law of large numbers for continu-
ous random variables is assumed to hold. This implies that idiosyncratic
shocks cancel-out in the aggregate and ensures that the distribution f ( )
is time invariant. Furthermore, in equilibrium the outow of rms is o¤-
set by the inow of new competitors, so that the number of incumbents
remains constant.









as the revenue net of taxes and variable cost. In the remainder, the optimal
default policy will be dened in terms of a default threshold Re such that,
if R  Re, it is optimal for the rm to remain active in the market and to




= e () dt+ e () dWt; (2.17)
where
e () = (   1)+ 1
2
(   2) (   1)2 and e () = (   1): (2.18)
The intensity of product market competition a¤ects both the revenue
growth rate and volatility. Specically, the volatility coe¢ cient e () in-
creases with the elasticity of substitution , while the e¤ect on the growth
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rate e () is ambiguous. Consider, rst, the e¤ect on e () and assume
that the rm is hit by a positive shock, that is an increase in  . Accord-
ing to the pricing rule (2.7), a higher productivity implies a lower optimal
price, an improvement in the competitive position of the rm and, there-
fore, an increase in prots (see equation (2.15)). The magnitude of this
e¤ect depends on the elasticity of substitution. When the elasticity of
substitution is high, the decrease in price will attract more customers and
cause a greater increase in demand and prots. A symmetric reasoning
holds for negative shocks. In that case, the increase in price and the de-
crease in demand and prots will be greater the higher is the elasticity of
substitution. Thus, volatility increases with competition.2
In contrast, the e¤ect on the growth rate is ambiguous. The reason is
that rms revenue is, in general, a non linear function of  . If the revenue
function is concave, the growth rate is less than the expected change in
productivity. A rise in the elasticity of substitution may increase the con-
cavity of the revenue function and decrease the growth rate. This happens
when  < (3=2  )2. When  > (3=2  )2, larger elasticity of sub-
stitution either reduces concavity or it increases convexity and, therefore,
it increases the growth rate.
2.2.5 Capital market
In a frictionless world, there is no need to hold cash reserves. If solvent in a
long-run perspective, a rm will always be able to raise liquidity by issuing
either new equity or debt at no costs. In contrast, if access to the capital
market is subject to frictions, external funding may not be freely available.
For this reason, it can be optimal for the rm to hold a certain amount
of cash reserves. To introduce the need for liquidity, I assume that rms
2A similar relation between competition and volatility is found in Raith (2003) and
Irvine and Ponti¤ (2009). Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2009) construct empirical
measures of competition based on the idea that, when competition becomes tighter,
market shares and prots reallocate faster to the more e¢ cient rms. An analogous
mechanism is at work here. Consider two rms with productivity  1 and  2, and
assume that  1 >  2. The relative di¤erence in prots between the two rms increases
with the elasticity of substitution.
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can raise external nance only at the initial time t = 0.3This captures
in a stylized way the idea that rms can nd it di¢ cult to access the
capital market at reasonable conditions (for example, because of problems
of asymmetric information or moral hazard) and need, at least to some
extent, to rely on internal resources.4
Without access to external nance, if a rm incur losses and has no
internal resources to meet its payments, it will be liquidated even if current
revenue is above the rst-best exit threshold, i.e. if R > Re. This is
clearly ine¢ cient. To avoid ine¢ cient liquidation, rms hold reserves of
liquidity (cash). In practice, cash is not the only mean by which rms
can manage idiosyncratic uninsurable shocks. For example, rms could
meet their liquidity needs by drawing down bank credit lines. However,
as documented by Lins et al. (2010), cash and credit lines are employed
to hedge against di¤erent risks. While, cash holdings serve as a bu¤er
against cash shortfalls in bad times, credit lines are mainly employed to
exploit protable investment opportunities. Consistent with this evidence,
I abstract from credit lines and assume that cash holdings are the only
mean to fund operating losses. In the remainder, cash will be indicated
by M .
Within the rm, cash reserves earn an interest equal to r. If r is below
the discount rate, r < , holding cash entails a liquidity premium and
is costly for the equity-holders. Then, rms trade-o¤ the costs of hold-
ing cash with the benets stemming from the insurance provided against
ine¢ cient liquidation. Here, I follow Mello and Parsons (2000) and Gry-
glewicz (2011), and assume that cash reserves earn an interest equal to the
discount rate, i.e. r = . This means that there are no costs of holding
cash it is never strictly optimal for the rm to pay out dividends. However,
there is a nite amount of cash reserves, indicated byM , which allows the
rm to avoid ine¢ cient liquidation. Firms nd it strictly optimal to re-
3The assumption that debt can be issued only at the entry date is customary in
dynamic contingent claim models of optimal capital structure (for example, Leland
(1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Sundaresan and Wang (2007) among others). Here, as
in Gryglewicz (2011), I impose the additional restriction that also equity nancing is
not available after the entry date.
4 I could also consider a milder form of capital market imperfection. The main
intuition of the model would not change.
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tain earnings they are at risk of ine¢ cient liquidation (i.e. M < M), while
they are indi¤erent between retaining and paying out the excess liquidity
if M M .5 As discussed in Appendix 2.A.5, M is the amount of cash re-
serves whose interest income is just su¢ cient to cover the worst-case losses
under the rst-best default policy. To avoid indeterminate scenarios, I as-
sume that, ifM > M , the excess liquidity is paid out to the equity-holders
in the form of dividends. Therefore, in the remainder I refer to M as the
optimal amount of cash.
In reality, holding cash within the rm can be costly, for example, be-
cause of agency problem as in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Abstracting
from agency considerations the cost of holding cash may arise because of
the disadvantage imposed by the double-taxation on internal funds or for
the fact that interest corporate cash is taxed at the corporate tax rate,
which in general exceeds the personal tax rate on interest income (Faulk-
ender and Wang 2006). At the same time, however, if external investors
are not as good as the rm at identifying protable investment opportu-
nities, holding cash within the rm is a value maximizing strategy. Here I
assume that, net of the liquidity risk imposed by the nancial constraint,
benets and costs of carrying cash o¤set each other. This assumption
comes at a cost of an upward bias on the predicted optimal amount of
rmscash holdings (rms accumulate so much cash to be perfectly in-
sured against ine¢ cient liquidation) but allows a clearer identications the
mechanisms by which competition a¤ects cash. Since rms are de facto
unconstrained the valuation problem can be solved by ordinary di¤eren-
tial equations which can be solved analytically with standard methods.
Whenever cash reserves are not su¢ cient to surely avoid ine¢ cient liq-
uidation, the value of the securities, namely equity and debt, will also
depend on the level of cash reserves and must be found as a (numerical)
solution of a partial di¤erential equation (see Murto and Terviö (2011)).
The assumption of no liquidity premium is further discussed in Section
2.2.7. Since r =  holds throughout,  is substituted by r, hereafter.
5On this point, see also Murto and Terviö (2011).
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Draw of the initial
productivity ψ0
t0 time
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events and timing decisions.
2.2.6 Entry
At every instant there is an arbitrarily large number of potential produc-
ers ready to enter the market. The industry entry rate is indicated by
n. Potential entrants freely decide to become active by paying a sunk
investment cost I. At the time of entry t0, rms draw their initial pro-
ductivity  0 from a uniform distribution dened over a common support
 ; 

.6 Since rms draw their initial productivity from the same dis-
tribution, they are identical ex-ante but di¤erentiate ex-post depending
on the evolution of the idiosyncratic shocks. Before knowing the value of
the initial productivity, internal equity-holders choose the initial level of
liquid assets, indicated by M0, and the debt-equity mix to maximize their
expected value at the entry date. A summary of the timing decisions is
found in Figure 2.1.
Consider the initial nancing problem and assume that raising external
6A uniform distribution is useful to derive closed-form solutions for the stationary
equilibrium (see also Miao (2005)).
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funds involves a xed issuance cost equal to L  0. Internal equity-
holders need to raise external funds to cover the sunk investment cost I,
the issuance cost L, and the entry cash reserves M0: Indicate by E 1 and
DBT 1 the equity and debt value at the entry time, where the subscript
" 1" means that I am considering the value before the draw of the initial
productivity. If ! 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of equity obtained by the external
equity-holders, then the following funding condition must hold:
I +M0 = !E 1 +DBT 1   L. (2.19)
Rearranging the above equality, the expected value for the internal equity-
holders is found as:
(1  !)E 1 = V 1   L  I  M0; (2.20)
where V 1 = E 1 +DBT 1 is the total expected value of the rm.
In a competitive equilibrium, rms enter the market as long as the
value of the internal equity-holders is weakly positive, (1  !)E 1  0.
Using equation (2.20), this implies that, in a stationary equilibrium, the
following entry condition must hold:
V 1 = L+ I +M0: (2.21)
Although there are no costs of holding cash (there is no liquidity pre-
mium), equation (2.21) reveals that raising cash is costly for the internal
equity-holders because it increases the total cost of entry. To optimally
nance the initial investment, credit constrained equity holders need to
furnish additional resources compared to the unconstrained case. Indeed,
they not only need to nance the initial investment outlay (L + I) but
have also to provide the rm with an initial stock of cash reserves (M0).
This is the case because entering the market without internal resources is
clearly suboptimal. If a negative shock strikes after the entry date, the
rm would be immediately liquidated before any prot materializes. The
cost of raising cash it will be called "liquidity cost", hereafter. A conse-
quence of the liquidity cost (not shown in the analysis) is to reduce the
number of rms in equilibrium compared to the unconstrained scenario. A
higher total cost of entry implies that, for a given expected initial produc-
tivity, a lower number of rms can a¤ord to become active in the market.
2.2. THE MODEL 23
Furthermore, as it will be shown in Section 2.4, the liquidity cost has
the important implication to force constrained rms to issue a suboptimal
level of debt.
To nd the initial amount of cash, it is useful to recall that, if a rm
follows the optimal cash policy, the value of a marginal unit of cash within
the rm is larger than or equal to one. To see this, let the value of the
rm be explicitly dependent on cash, V = V (M), while other variables
are omitted for notational convenience, and consider a rm with cash
reserves equal to M . If this rm follows the optimal cash policy, its value
must be greater than or equal to the value of a rm which holds cash
reserves equal to M   dM and pays a dividend equal to dM , that is
V (M)  V (M   dM) + dM . Rearranging the inequality and letting dM
go to zero yields V 0 (M)  1. In absence of liquidity premium, this implies
that the marginal value of cash is equal to its face value, V 0 (M) = 1,
whenever cash reserves are su¢ cient to avoid ine¢ cient liquidation, i.e.
when M M .
Consider, now, the choice of M0. Internal equity-holders choose M0
to maximize their value. Di¤erentiating (2.20) with respect to M yields
V 0 (M) = 1 which it is true for any M larger than or equal to M .7 Since
raising cash increases the cost of entry, rms will rationally choose the
minimum amount of cash that avoids ine¢ cient liquidation, i.e. M0 =M .
Thus, the entry condition becomes:
V 1 = L+ I +M: (2.22)
2.2.7 Discussion
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to briey summarize and
discuss the structure of the model. There is an industry with a contin-
7Condition (2.21) also implies that at the optimum E0 1(M) = 0. When a rm
is at liquidity risk (i.e. when M < M), an additional unit of cash brings the rm
further away from ine¢ cient liquidation and increases the value equity (net of cash),
i.e. E0 1(M) > 0. In absence of liquidity premium, it is optimal for the equity holders
to retain cash until to the point where the rm becomes de facto unconstrained and
value of equity equals the discounted stream of prots plus the default option. This
occurs for M = M . Beyond that point additional cash does not further increase the
value of equity, E0 1(M) = 0 (see also Mello and Parsons (2000)).
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uum of rms and an arbitrarily large number of potential entrants. Firms
make entry, exit and pricing decisions, and choose their optimal capital
structure. Access to credit is restricted and rms hold cash to avoid inef-
cient liquidation. The model is studied in the long-run stationary equi-
librium in which industry-wide variables remain constant. In equilibrium
the industry appears as "static" from an aggregate perspective but, at the
rm-level, a rich dynamic is still present. Individual rms undergo idio-
syncratic productivity shocks and experience changes in their protability.
Some of them optimally decide to exit, some others die due to the Pois-
son shocks, while new producers enter the industry until the equilibrium
entry condition (2.22) is restored. The fact that industry-wide variables
are time invariant has two implications. First, incumbent rms do not
have any incentive to engage in predatory pricing strategies to force their
competitors out of the market.8 Hence, at each instant, (2.7) is indeed the
optimal pricing rule. Second, protability of the individual rm is deter-
mined by the uctuations of its own productivity and not by the actions
of its competitors. This implies that each rm chooses nancing and exit
policy free from strategic considerations, and its value can be found with
the standard methods used for the valuation of a single monopolistic rm.
There are no costs of carrying cash, and rms hold the minimum
amount of cash reserves which allows avoiding ine¢ cient liquidation, M .
As shown in Appendix 2.A.5, M yields an instantaneous interest income
just su¢ cient to cover the worst-case losses under the rst best default
policy. This, coupled with the fact that excess liquidity is paid out by as-
sumption, implies that cash reserves will be constant over time and equal
to M . Thus, the optimal cash policy implied by the model is stylized in
two respects. First, since there is no liquidity premium, M is very large.
Even if the predicted optimal cash level is most likely overstated, this cap-
tures in a simple fashion the evidence that rms hold so large amounts
of cash that, in recent years, net debt (debt minus reserves of liquidity)
became negative for the typical rm (see Bates et al. (2009)). The second
simplication is that cash reserves remain constant at M while in reality
they uctuate with variations in the business conditions. This concern is
8This also depends on the fact that rms are innitesimal and the choice of a single
rm has no impact on the aggregate price index.
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mitigated by the fact that, as shown by Opler et al. (1999), rms have a
target cash level. Since the model studies an industry in its steady-state,
M can be interpreted as the amount of cash reserves that rms are will-
ing to hold in equilibrium. Finally, the purpose of this work is neither to
explain cash holdings dynamics nor to give quantitative predictions about
the optimal amount of liquid assets. Rather, the ultimate goal is to study
the qualitative e¤ects of competition on cash holdings. In my framework,
closed-form solutions for the industry equilibrium and the optimal level of
cash can be derived. This allows a clear identication of the channels by
which competition a¤ects rmscash holdings.
2.3 Exogenous leverage
In this section, I solve the model by taking the coupon payment b as
exogenously given. In Section 2.4, I will endogeneize the capital structure
decision. The motivation for this intermediate step is twofold. First, with
an exogenous coupon, the optimal cash policy has a full analytical solution.
Second, the predictions of this section hold for rms with no (or lack of)
exibility in choosing their capital structure. Also, leaving aside the debt
valuation part, the analysis applies for unlevered rms which produce with
xed costs equal to F + b.
2.3.1 Equilibrium
To begin with, I dene the long-run stationary equilibrium and prove its
existence and uniqueness. This is a necessary step because, if a station-
ary equilibrium fails to exist, the number of active rms and the aver-
age productivity keep changing over time, and the integrals (2.11) and
(2.12) cannot be evaluated with standard methods. To prove existence
and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium, I use the argument of Dixit
and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 8), and Miao (2005), and solve for the den-
sity g ( ) of the distribution f ( ) scaled by the entry rate n, such that
f ( ) = ng ( ). I restrict my attention to equilibria in which the pro-
ductivity exit threshold is lower than the initial productivity draw, that
is  >  e. This condition must be veried in equilibrium. Equilibria in
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which rms enter and immediately exit are not considered. Formal details
are relegated to Appendix 2.A.3.
A stationary equilibrium is dened by a distribution of productivity
levels f ( ), an exit threshold Re , an entry rate n




1. Firms set their prices according to (2.7),
2. Re is chosen to maximize the value of equity,
3. the entry condition (2.22) is satised,
4. the distribution f ( ) is an invariant measure over the interval  2
[ e;1),
5. each rm holds cash reserves equal to M =M

.
When the entry rate n and the distribution f ( ) = ng ( ) are de-
termined, the number of active rms and the average productivity in equi-
librium can be found asN = n
R1
 e









respectively. Point 1 above says that rms set the optimal market-clearing
prices, point 2 means that they choose the exit time to maximize equity-
holders value, while point 3 is the equilibrium entry condition. These
conditions are standard requirements in competitive equilibrium models.
In addition, point 4 is a consequence of the assumed law of large numbers
while point 5 is the liquidity requirement.
The next proposition establishes existence and uniqueness of the sta-
tionary equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1 Assume that
r +   e () > 0; (2.23)










Then, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium such that  >  e.
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As shown in Section 2.3.2, condition (2.23) serves to keep bounded the
discounted stream of expected prot and therefore the value of the active
rm. Furthermore in the proof of the proposition (Appendix 2.A.2) it is
shown that condition (2.24) is necessary for the existence of the stationary
distribution f ( ) while condition (2.25) guarantees that some higher
moments of the stationary distribution are nite. It is important to notice
that conditions (2.23) and (2.24) impose an upper limit, call it , on the
elasticity of substitution. Thus, a stationary equilibrium can be dened
in the range  2 (1; ]. Although this potentially limits the generality
of the results, for example the model cannot predicts what happens in
perfect competition, in Section 2.3.3 I claim the main intuition of the
model has a general validity and can be easily extended for larger values
of the elasticity of substitution.
2.3.2 Securities valuation
As a preliminary step, I rst nd the solution for the value of an uncon-
strained and unlevered rm, dened in (2.10).
Proposition 2.2 The value of the unconstrained and unlevered rm is
equal to
Vu(R) = (1  )

R















e () = 1
2
  e ()e ()2  
vuut" e ()e ()2   12
#2
+ 2
r + e ()2 < 0; (2.27)
and
Ru =
e ()e ()  1 r +   e ()r +  F (2.28)
is the level of revenue that triggers exit.
Then, the proposition below denes the value of equity and debt for
the levered rm.
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Proposition 2.3 The value of equity of a levered rm is equal to:
E(R) = (1  )

R


















e ()e ()  1 r +   e ()r +  (F + b) : (2.30)














Firms default as soon as revenue falls below Re.
2.3.3 Cash policy





0; 1  r +   e ()
r + 
e ()e ()  1
#
: (2.32)
The following proposition holds.






(F + b) 
. (2.33)
Proposition 2.4 shows that the optimal level of cash holdings is dened
by the product of two components. The rst, (1  ) (F + b) =r, is a cost
component and is given by the discounted stream of xed payments. The
second, 
, is the proportion by which revenue should fall below the xed
per-period payments to induce a rm to exit the industry (this is shown
in Appendix 2.A.5). This term is a proxy for rmswillingness to absorb
losses in bad times and can be interpreted an indicator of how valuable
is the option to remain active in the market. For this reason, 
 will be
called "option component". The option component, and therefore also the
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optimal cash, is zero if e ()  (r + ) =e () < 0. This happens because,
when the proportional growth rate e () is negative and su¢ ciently low,
the expected fall in protability is so rapid that that exit should occur
when the rm is still earning positive prots. Such a rm never experi-
ences losses during its (presumably short) existence and, therefore, it has
no reason to hold liquid assets. Expression (2.33) has an intuitive inter-
pretation. Since rms use liquid asset to cover losses, the optimal amount
of cash depends on the expected stream of costs, the cost component, and
on the willingness to cover these costs in bad times, the option component.
Higher xed costs imply larger losses when protability is low and require
a larger amount of liquidity to keep the rm alive. A larger value for the
option component implies that a rm is willing to absorb greater losses
before declaring default and, for this reason, it needs more cash reserves
as a bu¤er against future cash shortfalls.
The expression for M

is independent of the equilibrium variables
N and  A. This greatly simplies the comparative statics analysis be-
cause indirect equilibrium e¤ects do not need to be taken into account.9
The next proposition shows the e¤ect of competition on the optimal
amount of cash.
Proposition 2.5 If 




Proposition (2:5) says that, if it the rm holds a strictly positive
amount cash (i.e., if 
 > 0), M

increases with the intensity of com-
petition. Since M

is independent of the equilibrium variables and the
xed per-period payments F and b are exogenous, this e¤ect is entirely
driven by the option component 
. Thus, the result of Proposition (2:5)
is a consequence of the fact that competition makes the option to stay
active in the market more valuable, reinforcing the precautionary motive
for holding cash.
Equation (2.32) reveals that the elasticity of substitution  a¤ects 

through both the revenue volatility e () and growth rate e (). Since e ()
9 In the next section I show that, when the rm chooses its optimal capital structure,
indirect equilibrium e¤ects enter the cost component through the choice of the coupon
payment b.
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is increasing in  and @e () =@e () > 0 (i.e. e () decreases in absolute
value) the volatility channel has an unambiguous upward e¤ect on 
 and,
therefore, on the optimal amount of cash holdings. In contrast, the e¤ect
through the growth rate is ambiguous and positive when e () increases
with the elasticity of substitution, and the other way around.10 Both
results are intuitive. A higher volatility triggers the standard real options
e¤ect. When volatility is large, business conditions can rapidly improve
and this induces a rm to delay the exit decision. Similarly, a higher
growth rate means that it is optimal to remain active even when current
losses are sizeable. Both e¤ects imply that rms are willing to absorb
larger losses when current protability is low. In order to implement this
policy, rms need a larger amount of cash reserves.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.4, competition can both increase and de-
crease the revenue growth rate. The fact that the option component,
and therefore the optimal amount of cash, is increasing with competi-
tion stresses the importance of the volatility channel. A higher volatility
increases the amount of cash reserves even when competition has a de-
pressing e¤ect on the revenue growth rate. That is, although a higher
degree of product substitutability may lower the growth potential, the
consequent increase in volatility implies that the rm is nevertheless eager
to stay longer in the market and, therefore, holds a larger amount of cash.
In this sense, the increase in volatility is the key factor to explain the e¤ect
of competition on cash holdings.
As pointed at the end of Section 2.3.1, the parametric restrictions
(2.23) and (2.25) imply that a stationary equilibrium does not exist for
values of the product substitutability larger than . This connes the
analysis to imperfectly competitive markets with a relatively low inten-
sity of competition. The intuition behind Proposition 2.5, however, can
be easily applied to highly competitive markets and even extended to the
limit case of perfect competition. In fact, the main mechanism identied
by the model is straightforward. By raising prot volatility, competi-
tion increases the value of the option to remain active in the market and
strengthens the precautionary motive for holding cash. Since the e¤ect of
competition on volatility is monotonic in the range  2 (1;1) (cf. the
10 It can be checked that @
=@e () > 0 holds if condition (2.24) is satised.
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denition of e () in (2.18)), intuition suggests that the same reasoning
can apply for   . At the same time, however, the fact that competition
increases the option value to remain active in the market can be di¢ cult
to reconcile with the idea that under perfect competition economic prots
are zero. The two e¤ects are not necessarily in contrast. If it is true that
perfect competition implies zero economic prots in a static model with
symmetric rms, this is not necessarily the case in a dynamic setting in
which a certain degree of asymmetry is allowed. Under perfect competi-
tion, a rm that becomes more e¢ cient than the pool of incumbents can
capture the entire demand and make positive prots by setting a price
just below the marginal cost of its most e¢ cient competitor. As illustra-
tive example, it is useful to think of a Bertrand duopoly setting. If rms
are symmetric, it is well known that Bertrand interaction yields the com-
petitive market outcome and economic prots are indeed zero. But when
rms are asymmetric, that is they have di¤erent marginal costs, the most
e¢ cient one can capture the entire market and make positive prot. If we
allow for idiosyncratic shocks to marginal costs, the identity of the most
e¢ cient rm can change over time and, in fact, rms may switch from
having no market to capturing the entire demand. Consistent with this
intuition, the model implies that under perfect competition, volatility is
innite and a rm with a productivity above the market average,  >  A,
enjoys innite prots, lim
!1
 =1. This suggests that the argument that
competition increases the option value to remain in the market does not
need to be restricted in the range  2 (1; ] but can have a more general
validity.
2.4 Optimal capital structure
In the previous section the coupon payment is taken as exogenous. Here,
I give the full characterization of the model and let the rms to optimally
choose their capital structure. The coupon payment b is chosen by the
internal equity-holders at the time of entry, but before the draw of the
initial productivity  0 (see the timeline in Figure (2.1)). Then, rms enter
the market with an amount of cash reserves su¢ cient to avoid ine¢ cient
32 CHAPTER 2. CASH AND COMPETITION
liquidation and follow the optimal unconstrained policy afterwards. To
obtain closed-form solutions, I further assume that rms have no xed
costs of production, i.e. F = 0. It follows that the optimal amount of
cash is equal to




(cf. equation (2.33)). Equation (2.34) implies that a rm which issues
more debt must also hold more cash to meet future coupon payments. This
is a "mechanical" consequence of the fact that rms hold cash to cover
costs and suggests that it may exist a positive relation between leverage
and liquidity. In contrast, in Section (2.4.2) I show that the endogenous
determination of the capital structure implies that factors that tend to
increase cash exert, in general, a downward pressure on debt, and this can
generate a negative relation between cash and leverage.
Consider equation (2.20) and let all the relevant variables to be ex-
plicitly dependent on the coupon b. For convenience, the dependence on
other variables is omitted. The value for the internal equity-holders is:
(1  !)E 1( b) = V 1(b)  L  I   M (b) : (2.35)








 = 0: (2.36)
With a free access to the capital market, an unconstrained rm does not
need reserves of liquidity and optimally saves on the cost of entry by raising
no cash at the initial date, M0 = 0. Thus, the unconstrained rst-best
coupon satises the rst order condition V 0 1(b) = 0 and equalizes the
marginal benets of the tax-shield on prots with the marginal cost of
an increased bankruptcy risk. In contrast, a constrained rm needs cash
to survive once active in the market. But, as shown in equation (2.22),
hoarding cash at the initial date involves a liquidity cost because it raises
the total costs of entry. Thus, a constrained rm will also take into account
that higher debt payments require a larger amount of cash (via the cost
component) and increase the liquidity cost. In the rst order condition
(2.36), the liquidity cost is captured by the term M
0
(b) = (1  ) 
=r,
2.4. OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE 33
which represents the additional amount of cash that a rm should raise if
debt payments increase by one unit.
2.4.1 Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium with endogenous capital structure is dened by
a productivity distribution f ( ), an exit threshold Re , an entry rate n
,
a coupon b and an amount of cash M

such that:
1. Firms set their prices according to (2.7),
2. Re is chosen to maximize the value of equity,
3. the entry condition (2.22) is satised,
4. the distribution f ( ) is an invariant measure over the interval  2
[ e;1),
5. the optimal coupon b satises (2.36),
6. each rm holds cash reserves equal to M =M

.
Proposition 2.6 If assumptions (2.23)-(2.25) hold, there exists a unique
stationary equilibrium such that  >  e.
2.4.2 Securities valuation and cash policy
In absence of xed cost of production, an unlevered rm does not face any
xed payment and, therefore, it never exits. It follows that its value is
simply given by the discounted stream of revenue:
Vu(R) =
(1  )
r +   e ()R: (2.37)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium for the model
with endogenous leverage.
Proposition 2.7 The expressions for equity, debt, optimal coupon, exit
threshold and cash are given by
E(R) = (1  )

R
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The total value of the rm is given the sum of equity and debt and can
be written as the value of the unlevered rm, plus the tax benet of debt,
plus the risk-adjusted bankruptcy cost, as determined by the fraction of
the unlevered rms value lost at default:
V (R) =
(1  )
















Equation (2.40) shows that the optimal coupon payment for a constrained
rm is lower than or equal to the one of an unconstrained and cashless
rm. This happens because, as explained in the discussion following equa-
tion (2.36), debt imposes an additional liquidity cost to the constrained
rm.11 Furthermore, the wedge between bu and b
 increases with the op-
tion component 
. The larger is the option value to remain in the market,
11Equation (2.40) also shows that, if   
=(1 + 
), a constrained rm issues no
debt and would rather prefer to become a net lender (i.e. b < 0, a possibility ruled
out by assumption). This contrasts with the case of an unconstrained rm for which it
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Figure 2.2: The e¤ect of the elasticity of substitution on the bankruptcy
costs (dashed line) and tax benets of debt (solid line). Parameter values:
r = 0:04,  = 0,  = 0:1,  = 0:05,  = 5,  = 1, " = 0:8; I = 1. L = 0:
All graphs are plotted for a range of values of  such that conditions (2.23)
and (2.25) are satised.
the more compelling is the need to avoid default, and the stronger is the in-
centive to reduce debt payments compared to the rst best. Interestingly,
this mechanism may also give rise a to a negative relation between cash
and leverage. When the value to remain active in the market is large,
rms are willing to increase their cash balance to be able to withstand
negative shocks. But at the same time, they have also an incentive to
reduce the risk of liquidation by lowering xed interest payments on debt.
Therefore, factors that increase cash reserves tend to have the opposite
e¤ect on leverage.
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Figure 2.3: The e¤ect of competition on the coupon bond and optimal
amount of cash. Parameter values: r = 0:05,  = 0,  = 0:1,  = 0:05,
 = 5,  = 1, " = 0:8; I = 1. L = 0:
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2.4.3 Model analysis
To illustrate the predictions of the model, I set the parameter values as
follows.12 The risk-free interest rate is equal to r = 0:05 and the pro-
ductivity growth rate is  = 0. Miao (2005) sets the exogenous Poisson
death rate equal to 0.04 based on the consideration that the turnover rate
is approximately 7% (Dunne et al. (1988)) and that the default rate is
around 3% (Brady and Bos (2002)). Consistent with this evidence, I set
 = 0:04. The entry and issuance costs are normalized to one and zero,
respectively, I = 1 and L = 0. The corporate tax rate is set equal to
 = 0:34 and the recovery rate equal to (1  ") = 0:2, as in Miao (2005).
Finally, a value must be chosen for the upper and lower bounds of the ini-
tial productivity level,  and  . Since possible reference values to match
(as, for example, Tobins q for the average rm or the turnover rate) are
insensitive to the parameterization of  and  , the choice is arbitrary. I
set  = 5 and  = 1. Finally, the range of values for  in the comparative
statics analysis must satisfy assumptions (2.23) and (2.25).
The analysis of Section 2.3 revealed that a higher elasticity of substi-
tution makes the option to stay active in the market more valuable and
increases the optimal amount of cash reserves. Now, the overall e¤ect also
depends on how competition a¤ects the choice of the coupon payment b.
Let me consider, rst, the e¤ects of competition on costs and benets of
issuing debt. As implied by equation (2.36), the optimal capital structure
decision is the result of a trade-o¤ between the tax benets and the total
costs of leverage, given by the increased risk-adjusted bankruptcy cost and
the higher liquidity cost. Figure 2.2 shows that competition reduces the
tax-shield benets of debt and increases the risk-adjusted costs of bank-
ruptcy. Although the driving forces behind this result are di¢ cult to pin
down analytically, the explanation is nevertheless intuitive. Competition
decreases the expected prots for the average rm and, at the same time,
increases volatility. Lower prots and higher volatility together raise the
risk of default, lower the benets of the tax-shield on prots, and increase
the risk-adjusted bankruptcy costs. Furthermore, since a higher elastic-
ity of substitution has an positive e¤ect on the option component 
, debt
12For di¤erent parameterizations, the qualitative results of the model do not change.
38 CHAPTER 2. CASH AND COMPETITION











Table 2.1: The e¤ect of the elasticity of substitution on the cash and leverage
ratios for the average rm. Parameter values: r = 0:05;  = 0;  = 0:1; r =
0:05;  =  A;  = 5;  = 1; " = 0:8; I = 1; L = 0: For  = 1, the value of the
rm is innite and the equilibrium problem has no solution. The reported values
for the cash and leverage ratios are to be intended for  approaching one from
above.
payments must be backed by a larger amount of cash, so that the liquidity
cost of debt also increases.13
The above discussion implies that the net benets of leverage are un-
equivocally lower when competition is more intense. For this reason, the
optimal coupon b is expected to decrease with the elasticity of substi-
tution. Figure 2.3 (dashed line) conrms this intuition and shows that
b (and thus the cost component) is indeed a monotonically decreasing
function of . Reminding the result of Section 2.3, this implies that
two contrasting forces determine the e¤ect of competition on the opti-
mal amount of cash reserves. On the one hand, competition makes rms
prots more volatile increasing the option value to remain active in the
market. This force has a positive e¤ect on cash. But on the other hand,
competition increases the risk of default and induces the rms to adjust
their cost structure by reducing debt payments. Lower debt payments
decrease xed costs and tend to reduce the optimal amount of cash re-
13 Indeed, from equation (2.36), note that M
0
(b) = (1  )
=r  0.
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serves. The interaction of these two forces suggests that, potentially, cash
can both increase or decrease with competition depending on whether the
e¤ect on the option component or the one on the cost component domi-
nates. Figure 2.3 (solid line) shows that, in the numerical example, M

increases monotonically with . The existence of a region in which the
e¤ect on the cost component is dominant, and competition has a negative
e¤ect on cash, cannot be ruled out with certainty. However, I was unable
to nd parameter values such that M

is decreasing in  and, at the same
time, conditions (2.23)-(2.25) and the requirement  >  e are satised.
Beside the simulation results, other motivations support the idea that
the downward e¤ect via the cost component is likely to be of second or-
der. To begin with, cash holdings surely increase with competition for low
levels of product substitutability. To see this, consider the limit case in
which there is no substitutability between products. Recalling the deni-




= 0: The explanation
is that, with no product substitutability, rms are insulated against sto-
chastic uctuations and have no reason to hold cash.14 An increase in
the degree of product substitutability has the e¤ect of introducing un-
certainty and generates the need for liquidity. Therefore, cash reserves
are increasing when the intensity of competition is initially low. Further-
more, to nd closed-form solutions, I solved the capital structure model
by setting the xed production costs equal to zero, F = 0. However, the
latter assumption is hardly realistic. With positive xed cost of produc-
tion, interest payments on debt represent a smaller fraction of the total
xed payments. Then, the reduction in leverage induced by competition
has a relatively lower impact on the total size of the cost component and
the upward e¤ect on the option value is more likely to prevail. Finally,
I assume that rms freely choose their capital structure before the entry
date and, thus, have a high degree of exibility in adjusting debt payments
to the market structure. However, when capital markets are imperfect, it
14 Indeed, from (2.15) and (2.9) it follows that lim
!1
 (R) = (1  ) (1=N   F   b).
The intuition is that, when the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, an increase
(decrease) in price is perfectly o¤set by a corresponding decrease (increase) in demand,
so that prots remain una¤ected. The cost of productivity uctuations is entirely borne
by consumers.
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can be di¢ cult for the rms to substantially reduce their debt payments.
This may be because access to equity nancing can be even more costly
than debt or because the original level of leverage is already low (e.g.,
nancially constrained rms are often zero-debt rms). Lack of nan-
cial exibility impairs the functioning of the cost component channel and
makes the upward e¤ect on cash due to the option component more likely
to dominate.
To establish a closer link with the empirical literature, I present the
prediction of the model for two widely used measures of cash and leverage.
Table 2.1 shows the e¤ects of the elasticity of substitution on the leverage
ratio (dened as DBT (R)=(V (R) +M






)) for the average rm in the industry, that is a rm with
productivity equal to  =  A. The table reveals a pattern analogous to
Figure 2.3 and shows that the leverage ratio decreases with the intensity of
competition while the cash ratio increases. As already anticipated, the key
mechanism identied by the model is as follows. Competition, mainly due
the e¤ect on prot volatility, increases the option value to remain active
in the market and makes rms more willing to hold cash to withstand
negative shocks. At the same time, a larger option value is an incentive
to lower the risk of liquidation, and rms do so by reducing leverage and
interest payments on debt. This prediction is the main message of the
model and nds support in the preliminary evidence, reported in Frésard
and Valta (2011), that rms increase cash reserves and substitute debt for
equity in response to increased competitive pressure.
From a quantitative point of view, Bates et al. (2009) show that in
recent years the cash ratio reached values up to 0.15 for the median rm
and well above 0.2 for the average rm. Despite the fact that in the model
rms hold an amount of cash large enough to avoid ine¢ cient liquidation,
the predicted cash ratio for the average rm is below the values observed in
the data (see Table 2.1). This result is easily explained by the assumption
of zero xed production costs. Positive xed costs of production would
increase the cost component and bring the cash ratio close to the empir-
ically observed values. Importantly, the model predicts a leverage ratio
close to the historical average of 25% reported in Barclay et al. (2006). A
known concern with the standard contingent claim models of optimal cap-
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ital structure is that they usually predict unreasonably high values for the
leverage ratio. However, as pointed out by Miao (2005), in a stationary
equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms, there are not many incum-
bents with a low value of equity because the less e¢ cient competitors are
forced out of the market. Self-selection implies that the average rm will
result relatively less leveraged. Beside such equilibrium mechanism, in
the model an additional e¤ect is at work. Due to the need of raising cash,
constrained rms face a higher cost of leverage and choose a more debt-
conservative capital structure (see equation (2.40) and its interpretation).
This further decreases the leverage ratio of the typical rm.
2.5 Conclusion
This work studies the e¤ects of competition on rmscash holdings. I de-
velop a model of monopolistic competition with imperfect capital markets
in which rms make entry, exit and pricing decisions, choose their capital
structure, and hoard cash to avoid ine¢ cient liquidation. Product mar-
ket competition a¤ects rmscash policy in two di¤erent and contrasting
ways. On the one hand, by increasing prot volatility and the option
value to remain active in the market, it reinforces the precautionary mo-
tive for holding cash. But on the other hand, by increasing the risk of
bankruptcy, it induces the rms to reduce leverage. With a more debt-
conservative capital structure rms face lower interest payments on debt
and need less cash to avoid ine¢ cient liquidation. Although the overall
e¤ect on cash is potentially ambiguous, the upward e¤ect due to a larger
option value dominates.
The model generates the following predictions. First, cash holdings
increase with competition. Second, there is a negative relation between
cash holdings and leverage induced by the option value to remain active
in the market. When this option value is larger, rms are willing to hold
more cash to withstand negative shocks. At the same time, rms face
a more compelling need to limit losses in bad times and they do so by
reducing leverage and interest payments on debt. Finally, the model also
predicts that, by increasing the option value, competition exacerbates the
negative relation between cash and debt.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Valuation problem in terms of  
For future reference, it is useful to express the value of equity and the exit
threshold in terms of  : The value of equity E( ) satises
1
2


















  F + b
r + 
; (2.47)
E( e) = 0; (2.48)
and
E0( e) = 0: (2.49)
Equation (2.47) means that, when  grows larger, the probability of exit
becomes negligible and the rms value is simply given by the discounted
stream of prots. Equation (2.48) implies that at exit time the value of
the rm is zero, while equation (2.49) means that the exit threshold is
chosen to maximize equity-holders value. Solving (2.46) under (2.47)-
(2.49) yields the expressions for the exit threshold  e and equity E( ):
 e =  A


   (   1)
r +   e ()
r + 






























where  = 1=2  =2  
q
[=2   1=2]2 + 2r=&2 < 0. Notice that condi-
tion (2.23) guarantees that the value of equity is bounded.
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2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Here I prove existence and uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium with
exogenous leverage. To nd the productivity distribution of incumbent
rms, I solve for the density g ( ) of the distribution f ( ) scaled by
the entry rate n, such that f ( ) = ng ( ). Overall, I have four unknowns
g ( ),  e, n
, M.
I proceed according to the following steps. First, I nd the value
for W = N ( A)
 1 which satises the entry condition. Using equation
(2.50), this allows determining the unique equilibrium exit threshold  e.
Then, I nd the scaled density g ( ) and, using equation (2.22), the equi-
librium entry rate n. Finally, the number of active rms is determined
as N = n
R1
 e
g ( ) d .
Let me nd, rst, the exit threshold  e. Consider the expected value
















Using the denition of R and computing the expected values, the expres-
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()+1    ( 1)e()+1h
(   1) e () + 1i       (2.55)
are the (   1) th and (   1) e () th moments of the initial productivity
draw. V 1 decreases monotonically in W and, therefore, there is a unique
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combination W  = N ( A)
 1 which satises (2.22). Once W  is deter-
mined, using equation (2.50), the solution for the unique equilibrium exit




   (   1)






The equilibrium exit threshold (2.56) uniquely denes the support  2
[ e;1) for the productivity distribution of the active rms. I now solve
for the density g ( ) of the distribution f ( ) scaled by the entry rate n.
This step of the proof follows Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 8) and
Miao (2005).
I start using the transformation z = log ( ). The new variable z follows
a geometric Brownian motion:
dzt
zt
= dt+ &dWt; (2.57)
where  =  1=22 and & = . The initial productivity draw in terms of z
has an exponential distribution over [z; z], where z = log and z = log .
This distribution has density function
m (z) = e(z ez); (2.58)
where ez = log      .
The equilibrium density is dened over the interval z 2 [ze ;1), where
ze = log ( 

e). I derive it by using a binomial approximation for the
Brownian motion. Time is divided in intervals of length dt and the z-
space in small segments of length dh = &
p
dt. In each time interval, all
rms located in a segment will move away. A fraction (1  ) dt will move





















while a fraction dt will die because of the Poisson shock. Dene n (z)
the density of active rms in a segment centered at z, where the entry rate
n is a scale factor. Such a density is time invariant if, in a given z interval,
the outow of rms due to the Brownian shocks or the Poisson death is
o¤set by the inow of incumbents with higher or lower productivity and
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new entrants. Consider, rst, the case where z 2 [z; z]. In this segment the
old rms will be replaced by new entrants and rms coming from above
and below. The density in the segment remains constant over time if the
rate at which rms leave equal the rate arrival rate:
n (z) dh = ndtm (z) dh+ qd (1  dt)n (z) dh+ qu (1  dt)n (z) dh:
(2.59)




&200 (z)  0 (z)   (z) +m (z) = 0: (2.60)
Consider, now, segments centered in z 2 [z;1) and z 2 [ze ; z], where
ze = log 

e. In these cases the segment is outside the range for the initial
productivity draw and, therefore, there is no ow of new entrants, but
only incumbent rms coming from above and below. Steps analogous as
before yield the ordinary di¤erential equation
1
2
&200 (z)  0 (z)   (z) = 0: (2.61)
Solution of (2.60) and (2.61) implies that
 (z) = A1e
1z +A2e
2z in the region z 2 (z;1) (2.62)




+   12 &2
in the region z 2 [z; z] (2.63)
 (z) = C1e
1z + C2e















Constants A1, A2, B1, B2, C1 and C2 are determined by the boundary
conditions Z 1
z
 (z) dz <1 (2.67)
 (ze ) = 0 (2.68)
lim
z"z
 (z) = lim
z#z
 (z) (2.69)
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lim
z"z










0 (z) = lim
z#z
0 (z) (2.72)
Condition (2.67) says that the number of active rms is nite and implies
that A2 = 0. Condition (2.68) derives from the fact that at ze rms
exit. Conditions (2.69)-(2.72) ensure smoothness of the density function
 (z). Solving the system of linear equations (2.68)-(2.72), and writing the
solution in in terms of  , yields the following expression for the coe¢ cients
A1, B1, B2; C1, C2:
A1 =









1 1    1 1

(r +   )
 










1 2    1 2

+ (1  2) 1 1
(r +   )
 







(r +   )
 









1 2    1 2

(r +   )
 







 1 2    1 2

(r +   )
 




The solution for the scaled equilibrium density is
g ( ) =
8>><>>:
A1 















1 + C2 
2 if  2
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rium density is nite. For also the average productivity  A to be nite
it must be that
R1
 e




  1g ( ) d is nite. The integral is bounded if  + 1 < 0: This is
true when assumption (2.25) holds.
The next step is to derive the equilibrium entry rate n. Having the
expression for g ( ) the equilibrium entry rate n must satisfy the entry
condition (2.22). The expected value of the rm before the initial pro-
ductivity draw V 1( ) monotonically declines in n and, therefore, there
is a unique n that satises (2.22). Then, the average productivity, the














g ( ) d ; (2.81)
and this completes the denition of the stationary equilibrium. 
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
The solution of equation (2.10) satises
1
2






r +   e ()   Fr + ; (2.83)
Vu(Ru) = 0; (2.84)
and
V 0u(Ru) = 0; (2.85)
where Ru is the level of revenue that triggers exit. Conditions (2.83)-
(2.85) have the same interpretation as (2.48)-(2.49). Solving (2.82) under
(2.83)-(2.85) yields (2.26) and (2.28).
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2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
The value of equity can be found in a way analogous to the value of the













DBT (Re) = (1  ") Vu: (2.88)
Condition (2.87) means that, when the revenue grows larger, default be-
comes a remote possibility and the value of debt equals its face value.
Condition (2.88) means that, at default, debt-holders recoup the liquida-
tion value. Solving (2.86) under (2.87)-(2.88) yields (2.31).
2.A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Assume that the rm makes losses at the time of exit, i.e. Re  b F < 0.
To surely avoid ine¢ cient liquidation, the rm must be always able to meet
its payments. Without access to external funds, this implies that its cash
reserves must provide a stream of interest income su¢ cient to cover the
worst-case losses under the optimal unconstrained policy. Indeed, revenue
could remain arbitrarily close to the exit boundary Re for an innite time
without falling below it.






ds =   (1  )
Z 1
t
e (+)(s t) (Re   b  F ) ds:
(2.89)
If the rm makes non-negative prots at the time of exit, Re   b F > 0,
then it will hold no cash. It follows that the expression for the optimal


















(F + b) 
; (2.91)
where the expression for 
 is given in (2.32). Combining (2.90) and (2.91),
it is immediate to see that 
 represents the proportion by which revenue
must drop below the xed payment F + b to trigger default. 
2.A.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5
To prove Proposition 2.5, I nd it convenient to rewrite the optimal
amount of cash using the solution procedure outlined in Appendix 2.A.1.
Substituting equation (2.50) in Re = 1=N ( 

e= A)
 1, and using (2.90),









 = max 0; 1  r +   e ()
r + 

   (   1)

: (2.93)
Equations (2.32) and (2.93) allow to establish the equality:
e ()e ()  1 =    (   1) : (2.94)
The option component e







(   2)2: (2.95)






2 (r + ) r
2 (   r   )  (3  2)2   (   1)2 2
[   (   1)]2
: (2.96)
From (2.96) I obtain that de
=d > 0 and dM=d > 0 if  > (r + ) = 
1=2 (2   3)2+(   1)2 2=2, which is always true if (2.95) is satised.

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2.A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Substituting (2.43) in (2.50), and using (2.40) and (2.44), it can be noticed
that the expression for  e is independent of the endogenous variables  

A
andN and, therefore, it uniquely identies the equilibrium exit threshold.
Then, existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium can be proved as in
Appendix 2.A.2. 
2.A.8 Proof of Proposition 2.7
The expressions for equity, debt and cash can be found following the same
steps of the proofs of Propositions 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. The optimal coupon
b maximizies the expected value of the rm at the entry date V 1. The
expression for V 1 is given by
V 1 =
(1  )








































2 , and the
expressions for 	1 and 	1 are given in (2.54) and (2.55). 
Chapter 3




Waiting is an important feature of economic decisions. In many real life
situations, individuals can choose between acting immediately or waiting
for more favorable conditions. The concept of "option", which nds a
wide range of applications in nancial economics, is often based on the
opportunity (the right) to choose the optimal timing of a pre-specied
action.
Among the several factors that a¤ect the value of an option, a promi-
nent role is played by uncertainty. By raising the probability of extreme
events, uncertainty makes the possibility to "wait and see" more attrac-
tive and increases the option value. Although the academic literature
on nancial and non nancial options has mainly considered uncertainty
as risk, it is well known that the distinction between uncertainty with
known probabilities, or risk, and uncertainty with unknown probabilities,
or ambiguity, has a behavioral signicance. In this work we investigate,
theoretically and experimentally, the distinct roles of risk and ambiguity
51
52 CHAPTER 3. WILLINGNESS TO WAIT
on the optimal timing of option exercise.
Optimal timing decisions are not restricted to nancial options. On
the contrary, they nd a wide range of applications. A strand of literature,
known under the name of real options theory, applied the option method
to model several economic (and non economic) problems.1 This literature
emphasized the role of uncertainty in shaping economic decisions that
are, at least to some extent, irreversible. Although in the last two decades
the real options approach became a standard method in economics, the
empirical evidence for even the most basic predictions of the theory is
surprisingly scant.2 Up to our knowledge, this work is the rst attempt to
test, in a unifying real options framework, the e¤ects of the two forms of
uncertainty, risk and ambiguity, on the optimal timing of option exercise.
As a basis for our experimental study, we need a theoretical framework
in which risk and ambiguity are comparable (i.e., risk and ambiguity are
related to the same event), which features all the essential elements of the
real options theory, and which, at the same time, is easy to implement in
a laboratory experiment. The rst step of our investigation is to develop
a simple real options model that satises these requirements.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. A decision maker holds
the opportunity to invest in a project by paying a xed cost. The value
of the project grows deterministically over time but, at each instant, the
option to invest can disappear at an exogenously-specied expiration rate.
If the decision maker invests before expiry, he obtains a payo¤ equal to
1The role of irreversibility in investment problems was originally pointed out by Ar-
row (1968). Bernanke (1983) shows how irreversibility can explain cyclical movements
of investment. The standard formalization of the real option approach for investment
decisions is due to MacDonald and Siegel (1986). In more recent years, the real options
approach had a wide range of applications. For example, it has been used to study
the relation between corporate investment and asset pricing (Berk, Green, and Naik,
(1999), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004), Aguerrevere (2009)), the timing of
mergers and acquisitions (Lambrecht (2004), Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)), innovation
investments in competitive markets (Weeds (2002), Huisman and Kort (2003)), debt
default (Leland (1994)), and even to model political decisions (Polborn (2006), Keppo
et al. (2009)).
2Notable exceptions are Guiso and Parigi (1996), Moel and Tufano (2002) and the
experimental works of Oprea et al. (2009), Anderson et al. (2010) and List and Haigh
(2010). In a recent paper, Kellog (2010) estimates rmsresponsiveness to changes in
uncertainty using data on oil well drilling in Texas.
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the current value of the project minus the investment cost, while he gets
nothing otherwise. Thus, there is a value in delaying the investment, but
waiting involves an opportunity cost because the future payo¤ is uncertain.
There are two possible states of the world. In the good state, the expiration
rate is low, L, while in the bad state, it is high, H . The true value of
the expiration rate is unknown at the initial date but the decision maker
can learn about the true state of the world. If time progresses and the
investment opportunity does not expire, the decision maker can infer that
the state of the world is more likely to be good, and he updates his beliefs
accordingly.
We distinguish between a risky and an ambiguous scenario. In the
scenario that features risk, the decision maker knows the relative proba-
bility of the expiration rate being high or low. Risk is given by the spread
between high and low expiration rates, for the expected expiration rate
being constant. In the investment problem under ambiguity, the decision
maker has imprecise information about the probability of the two states of
the world. He only knows that this probability lies within a certain inter-
val. We show that risk delays investment, in accord with the real options
theory. This result depends on the fact that higher risk raises the upside
potential of the option. When the spread between high and low expira-
tion rates is larger, the fact that the option does not expire during a given
time interval is a more informative signal. This implies that the decision
maker becomes more rapidly condent of the state of the world being good
and, therefore, he waits for a higher project value before investing. The
e¤ect of ambiguity depends on the decision makers attitude towards am-
biguity. If he is ambiguity averse, investment is undertaken sooner. The
reason is that waiting involves an uncertain prospect, while an immediate
investment yields a certain payo¤. An ambiguity averse decision maker
dislikes the uncertainty associated with the waiting region and prefers to
invest sooner. In contrast, investment is delayed if the decision maker is
ambiguity seeking.
With the support of Figure 3.1, it is useful to interpret our model in
comparison with the standard Ellsberg (1961) experiment. In a typical
Ellsberg-style setting, subjects decide how much to pay to participate in
two lotteries, risky and ambiguous, represented by a draw from an urn
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with balls of di¤erent colors, G and B in the gure (for example, Fox and
Tversky (1995), and Halevy (2007)). In the risky lottery the composition
of the urn, that is the probability of extracting a B ball, is known and
risk is increased by a mean preserving spread of the expected payo¤. In
the ambiguous lottery the urn composition is (at least partially) unknown.
This means that the probability of extracting a B ball has not a unique
value, but is dened by a range. In this setting, decision makers disclose
their preferences by revealing their willingness to pay to participate in the
lottery, and a lower willingness to pay for the ambiguous lottery reveals
ambiguity aversion.
Our setup is designed to closely resemble Ellsbergs two-urn environ-
ment. In the model, the true expiration rate is determined at the initial
date by a draw from a distribution which is known in the risky case but
unknown in the ambiguous case. Risk is measured by the spread between
H and L, while ambiguity is measured by the probability interval for
the good and bad state. Instead of revealing their willingness to pay as
in the standard Ellsberg setup, decision makers disclose their preferences
by revealing their willingness to wait. A lower willingness to wait in the
ambiguous scenario is a sign of ambiguity aversion.
To test the predictions of the model, we replicate it in a laboratory
experiment. We initially run three treatments. The rst treatment, called
Benchmark, is a risky treatment in which subjects know the values of
the high and low expiration rates and the relative probability of the two
states of the world, set equal to 50%. The second treatment, called Risk,
is also a risky treatment but risk i.e., the spread between the high and
low expiration rates, is increased compared to Benchmark. In the third
treatment, called Ambiguity, the values for the high and low expiration
rates are as in Benchmark but we introduce ambiguity by not giving any
information about the relative probability of the two states of the world.
Experimental data strongly support the theoretical prediction about
risk. In the treatment Risk, the investment decision is delayed compared
to Benchmark. Somewhat surprisingly, we also nd that the investment
decision in Ambiguity is delayed compared to Benchmark. According to
the predictions of our theoretical model, this is a sign of ambiguity seek-
ing. To test the robustness of the latter result, we run another treatment,
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Figure 3.1: Risk and ambiguity in a static and a dynamic setup.
called Mild Ambiguity in which we depart from the common practice to
provide no information about the probability distribution of the unknown
scenario. In this new treatment, growth and expiration rates as in Bench-
mark and Ambiguity but subjects have a partial information about the
relative probability of the states of the world. Specically, they know that
the probability of the expiration rate being high lies somewhere in between
20% and 80%. Data reveal that in Mild Ambiguity investment is still de-
layed compared to Benchmark, though the e¤ect is substantially weaker
than in Ambiguity. Overall, we nd a weak conrmation of an ambiguity
seeking attitude.
3.1.1 Related literature
Some recent papers test the real options theory in laboratory experiments.
Oprea et al. (2009) take the standard real options model based on geo-
metric Brownian motion and study whether subjects can learn the optimal
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investment rule. They nd supportive evidence that, by experience, in-
dividual behavior converges towards optimality. Anderson et al. (2010)
study a pre-emption investment game and nd that, for the most part,
the predictions of the theory are conrmed. List and Haigh (2010) focus
on another facet of the theory of investment under uncertainty, the bad
news principle, and conclude that experimental data support it.3
Theoretical contributions that introduce ambiguity into models of in-
vestment under uncertainty are Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) and Miao
and Wang (2011). Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) rely on the assumption of
ambiguity-aversion and show that increased ambiguity delays investment
in projects that generate an innite ow of ambiguous cash ows. In
contrast, our model considers the case where investment yields a certain
(unambiguous) payo¤ and it is therefore closer to the job-search model of
Nishimura and Ozaki (2004). Consistent with our result, Nishimura and
Ozaki (2004) show that an increase in ambiguity decreases the reserva-
tion wage and induce the ambiguity-averse worker to stop the job search
earlier. Miao and Wang (2011) further clarify that the sign of the e¤ect
of ambiguity depends on whether uncertainty is resolved or not at the
time of the investment. When ambiguity a¤ects only the waiting region
and the payo¤ is certain, ambiguity accelerates investment, if the decision
maker is ambiguity averse. In contrast, if the nal payo¤ is also ambigu-
ous, investment is delayed. Since we consider the case where the payo¤
from investment is certain, our model is consistent with the predictions of
Miao and Wang (2011).
The investment models of Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) and Miao and
Wang (2011) assume that the degree of ambiguity is not reduced by ob-
servational data.4 This work takes a di¤erent perspective and considers
an environment in which information on the nature of uncertainty is pro-
gressively revealed to the decision maker. This choice is dictated by our
belief that the combined presence of learning and ambiguity is an accu-
rate description of many dynamic real-life situations. Decision makers
often face situations that can be described as ambiguous. However, if the
environment remains stable for a certain amount of time, they have the
3All these experiments exclusively focus on investment under risk.
4Miao and Wang (2011) present a job-matching model with learning.
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possibility to learn the nature of uncertainty. Hence, we think of an eco-
nomic environment where the emergence of new (ambiguous) scenarios is
followed by intervals of relative stability, which allow individuals to learn.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops
a model of investment under risk and ambiguity. Section 3.3 describes the
experimental design and the testable hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents the
empirical results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 A simple stopping problem
We rst present a simple optimal stopping problem that will serve as
a building block for our analysis. Time is continuous and labeled by
t 2 [0;1). A risk neutral decision maker (DM henceforth) discounts the
future at rate r and has an opportunity (option) to invest in a project
of value Vt by paying a xed cost equal to C.5 The value of the project
grows deterministically over time and, therefore, the DM has an incentive
to wait. However, the opportunity to invest can expire and disappear at
a random time. This means that if the DM invests at time t before the
opportunity expires, he obtains a payo¤ Vt   C, while he gets nothing
otherwise. The DM has to decide when to invest.
The value of the project Vt evolves according to
dVt = Vtdt, (3.1)
where  > 0 is the growth rate. It follows that the value of the project at
time t is equal to
Vt = V0e
t: (3.2)
At each instant, the investment opportunity may vanish with a strictly
positive probability. The expiration of the investment option is modeled
as a Poisson shock with mean arrival rate  > 0. This means that, over a
period of time t, the DM loses the opportunity to invest with probability
5The assumption of risk neutrality does not a¤ect the qualitative predictions of the
model, which are the object of our experimental analysis. In Appendix 3.A.6, we show
that the fundamental results hold even when the decision maker is risk averse.
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t. We assume that  + r >  to guarantee that the option to invest
will be exercised in nite time.
We denote by V K the project value such that, if Vt  V K , it is optimal
for the DM to exercise the investment option. The subscript K stands
for "known," to indicate that the DM has a perfect knowledge of the
expiration rate . The following proposition provides the expression for
the optimal investment trigger.
Proposition 3.1 The optimal investment trigger is
V K =

   1C; (3.3)
where  = (+ r) = > 1.
The ratio = (   1) > 1 gives the proportion by which the value of
the project should grow above the cost to induce the DM to invest. A
higher  decreases the investment trigger. Intuitively, if the probability
of losing the investment opportunity is larger, the DM will exercise the
investment option sooner. In contrast, when  is higher, he will postpone
the investment in order to exploit the larger growth potential.
3.2.2 Unknown expiration rate
Consider, now, a slightly modied setting. As in the previous section, the
DM has the opportunity to invest in a project of value Vt which grows
according to (3.1). At each instant, the option to invest expires with a
strictly positive probability and the expiration rate is determined by the
intensity of a Poisson process. However, the expiration rate is unknown.
The DM knows that two states of the world are possible. In the bad state,
the expiration rate, H , is high. In the good state the expiration rate,
L, is low (H > L holds). The DM knows the values of the two s but
does not know the realization of the state. To ensure that the investment
problem has always a nite solution, we assume that
r + L > : (3.4)
Suppose that the DM has a subjective belief about the relative prob-
ability of the two states. Specically, he thinks that the intensity of the
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expiration rate is L with probability p 2 (0; 1). For the moment, we do
not specify how this belief is formed at the initial time t = 0. However, we
do specify how it evolves over time. If at t = 0 the DM nds it optimal not
to invest immediately, he waits for larger values of the project. By wait-
ing, the DM observes the investment payo¤ to rise according (3.1) and the
(non)occurrence of the expiry. If the DM waits and the option to invest
does not expire, he updates his belief in a Bayesian fashion. According to
Bayesrule, after an interval t, DMs posterior belief is:
pt +pt =
pt (1  Lt)
pt (1  Lt) + (1  pt) (1  Ht)
: (3.5)
Taking the limit for t ! 0 and rearranging yields the instantaneous
change in belief:
dpt = pt (1  pt) (H   L) dt: (3.6)
Equation (3.6) can be interpreted as the speed at which the DM learns
about the true state of the world. The speed of learning is proportional
to the di¤erence  = H   L. The explanation is that, when the
di¤erence between H and L is large, the fact that during a given time
interval the option to invest does not vanish is very informative. Then, the
DM becomes rapidly condent that the true expiration rate is low and,




(1  p0) eLt + p0eHt
; (3.7)
where p0 is the belief at time t = 0.
In the remainder, we distinguish two di¤erent scenarios. First, we have
a risky scenario ("Risk"), in which the DM knows the relative probability
of the two states of the world at the initial time. Second, we consider
and an ambiguous scenario ("Ambiguity"), in which the probability is
unknown.
3.2.3 Risk
In the scenario that we call "Risk," the DM has a single initial prior,
denoted by p, which denes the probability of the expiration rate being
L at time 0. The analysis here is consistent with the assumption that the
60 CHAPTER 3. WILLINGNESS TO WAIT
DM knows exactly the true probability with which the state of the world
is selected, or that he can form a single subjective prior that represents
his beliefs. In either case the standard expected utility model can be
applied. For a given initial expected expiration rate, we measure risk
as the spread between H and L for the expected expiration rate at
the initial time being constant. In other words, risk is measured by the
di¤erence  = H   L for a given pL + (1  p)H . The goal of this
section is to study the e¤ect of risk on the timing of investment. We show
that, in accord with the standard result from real options theory, risk
delays investment.
The decision problem is analogous to the one described in Section
3.2.1. The DM sees the value Vt growing deterministically over time and
has to decide when to invest. Appendix 3.A.2 proves that the value of the
investment option must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
Ft = max fVt   C; Ft + dFt   [r + (1  pt)H + ptL]Ftdtg . (3.8)
Equation 3.8 shows that, at each instant, the DM has to choose between
investing immediately to get the payo¤ Vt C, or to postpone the invest-
ment. Waiting allows capturing the benets of the positive growth rate,
but involves the cost associated with the risk of losing the investment
option. The option value Ft depends on two time varying variables, the
value of the project Vt and the belief pt. In Appendix 3.A.2 we also show
that, since both Vt and pt are deterministic functions of time, the dimen-
sionality of the problem can be reduced to only one state. Specically, we
can write DMs belief pt in terms of Vt, and use the value of the project as
the only state. The transformed belief function is denoted by p (Vt), and


















We denote the investment trigger by V R. If Vt  V R, it is optimal for
the DM to invest, while it is optimal to wait otherwise. The following
proposition holds.
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where R (Vt) = [r + p (Vt)L + (1  p (Vt))H ] =.
Then, we can study the qualitative e¤ects of an increase in risk.
Proposition 3.3 The investment trigger V R is non-decreasing in risk.
Proposition 3.3 says that, as our measure of risk increases, investment
is in general delayed. The explanation relies on the belief updating mecha-
nism. The proportion by which the project value Vt should grow above the
investment cost to induce the DM to invest is determined by R (Vt), which
increases with the expected expiration rate p (Vt)L+(1  p (Vt))H . Ac-
cording to equation (3.6), the posterior belief p (Vt) grows faster when the
spread between H and L is larger. This implies that, other things be-
ing equal, at each time t > 0 the expected expiration rate, and therefore
R (Vt), will be lower in a riskier scenario (i.e. when the spread  is
larger). Since R (Vt) =(R (Vt)   1) increases when R (Vt) decreases, it
follows that equation (3.10), which determines the investment trigger, will
be satised for a larger value of Vt. To have a more intuitive explanation
of the mechanism at work, one could interpret the result of Proposition
3.3 as follows. When risk is higher, learning proceeds faster and the DM
becomes more rapidly condent that the state of world is the good one
(i.e. the expiration rate is low). For this reason, he nds it optimal to
longer exploit the benets of the positive drift and to exercise the option
at a higher project value.6
6 In the standard real options investment problem, risk is measured by the volatility
coe¢ cient of the stochastic process (typically a Geometric Brownian Motion) which
denes the value of the underlying. Higher risk increases the value of waiting because
it enables the option holder to realize a larger upside potential avoiding the downside
risk. Our measure of risk, although via a di¤erent mechanism, preserves this intuition.
A mean preserving spread between H and L at the initial date increases the likelihood
of a bad outcome (i.e. the option expiry) in case the high expiration rate is drawn. But
at the same time, via the e¤ect of the learning mechanism, it also increases the upside
potential of the option. When risk increases, the DM becomes more rapidly condent
that the state of the world is the good one and, for this reason, he considers more likely
the possibility that Vt will reach larger values.
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The delay of investment in response to a higher risk depends on a
real options e¤ect (risk makes the option to wait more valuable) and it is
independent of DMs risk attitude. In fact, in Appendix 3.A.6 we solve the
model for a risk-averse DM with CRRA utility and show that, although
risk aversion a¤ects the option exercise strategy, the result of Proposition
3.3 still holds. In particular, we show that introducing risk aversion is
equivalent to reducing the proportional growth rate  and has the e¤ect
to accelerate the exercise of the investment option. However, for a given
degree of risk aversion, a higher risk increases the upside potential of the
option and delays investment,
3.2.4 Ambiguity
In the scenario that we call "Ambiguity" the DM has only an imprecise
knowledge about the initial probability of the two states of the world.
For this reason, the DM cannot form a single prior but can only identify
a set of plausible beliefs. Let Pt be a closed compact set of plausible
beliefs. At the initial time t = 0, the initial probability set is dened
by P0= [p  "; p+ "]. Here, p simply denotes the middle point of the set
of plausible initial probabilities while " 2 (0;min [p; 1  p]) is a measure
of the initial degree of ambiguity. The goal of this section is to study
how ambiguity a¤ects the timing of investment. We prove that the e¤ect
of ambiguity depends on the attitude of the DM. Specally, ambiguity
accelerates investment if the DM is ambiguity averse but delays investment
if the DM is ambiguity seeking.
As in the risky case described in Section 3.2.3, the DM learns about
the true state of the world. If time progresses and the investment option
does not vanish, he becomes progressively more condent that the true
expiration rate is L. However, contrary to the risky case, the learning
process does not involve a single prior but the entire set of plausible beliefs
Pt. To capture the learning process, we assume that the DM updates Pt
prior-by-prior. This means that each belief in Pt evolves according to
the dynamic described in (3.6) and, at a generic time t, satises (3.7).7
7Prior-by-prior Bayesian updating, is a common rule to update ambiguous be-
liefs. It was proposed, among others, by Wasserman and Kadane (1990) and Ja¤ray
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Because beliefs remain in the same order, the posteriors originating from
p   " and p + " represent the worst and best case beliefs, and dene the
boundaries of Pt. Call p+t the posterior belief under the best case scenario,
and p t the posterior belief under the worst case. At time t, those two
beliefs are equal to (cf. equation (3.7)):
p+t =
(p+ ") eHt




(1  p+ ") eLt + (p  ") eHt ; (3.12)







. It can be easily checked that the di¤erence between
p+t and p
 
t decreases with time as both beliefs asymptotically converge to
one. In other words, the range of ambiguity shrinks over time.
We do not restrict a priori DMs attitude towards ambiguity. To cap-
ture both ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking in a simple fashion,
we adopt the -MEU model proposed by Ghirardato et al. (2004). This
model is a combination of maxmin and maxmax expected utility, where an
agents utility (in our case the investment option value) is a fraction  of
the minimum plus a fraction 1  of the maximum expected utility, over
the feasible set of priors. A larger  implies a relatively higher degree of
ambiguity-aversion. When  = 1, the agent considers only the worst-case
among all possible outcomes and the model reduces to the maxmin model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). When  = 0, the agent considers only
the best-case. In our setting, the -MEU speication implies that the
investment opportunity is a convex combination of the investment option
evaluated under the worst case and best case beliefs, p t and p
+
t .




Vt   C; Ft + dFt  






















(1992) and axiomatized in Pires (2002). Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) provide a non-
exhaustive presentation of alternative rules to update ambiguous beliefs.
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Employing the same transformation as in Section 3.2.3, posterior beliefs
p t and p
+
t can be written as functions of the project value Vt. De-
note by p  (V ) and p+ (V ) the worst and best-case transformed beliefs,
respectively, and dene the "weighted belief" as pA (V ) = p  (V ) +












































where A (Vt) = [r + pA (Vt)L + (1  pA (Vt))H ] =.8
To study the e¤ect of ambiguity on the timing of investment, we rst
dene the concept of ambiguity neutrality. We call ambiguity neutral a
DM whose investment strategy in an ambiguous scenario does not di¤er
to his strategy in the unambiguous scenario, other things being equal.
More formally, let the investment trigger momentarily be dependent on
the degree of ambiguity, i.e., V A ("). A DM is ambiguity neutral if he
is characterized by an ambiguity attitude parameter  =  such that
V A (0) = V

A (e"), where e" is a given degree of ambiguity. In fact, since the
unambiguous scenario " = 0 corresponds to the risky case outlined in the
previous section, ambiguity neutrality can equivalently be dened by the
condition V R = V

A, other things being equal. Using (3.10) and (3.16),
and solving the previous equality with respect to  yields:
 = 






(H   L) (p+ (V )  p  (V ))
,
8When p = 0:5 and the degree of ambiguity is maximal (" = 0:5) worst and best
case beliefs are p  = 0 and p+ = 1 and are not subject to updating dynamics (cf. 3.6).





where A = [r + (1  )L + H ] =. Assumption (3.4) ensures that A > 1.
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where  R (V
) = [r + p  (V )L + (1  p  (V ))H ] = and V  = V R =
V A. It is worth noting that the parameter 
 is a function of ".9 This
means that the value of  which identies ambiguity neutrality is not
unique but varies in relation to the degree of ambiguity. In other words,
an ambiguity neutral DM will be identied by a di¤erent  depending on
the degree of ambiguity.
Ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking are dened as follows. We
call ambiguity averse a DM that weighs relatively more the worst case
scenario compared to the ambiguity neutral DM. That is, a DM is ambi-
guity averse if  > . Similarly, a DM is ambiguity is seeking if  < .
The following proposition shows the e¤ect of ambiguity on the investment
decision.
Proposition 3.5 Compared to the unambiguous case, " = 0, ambiguity
accelerates investment if the DM is ambiguity averse, while it delays in-
vestment if the DM is ambiguity seeking.
Proposition 3.5 reveals that the e¤ect of ambiguity on the investment
decision crucially depends on the attitude towards ambiguity. If the DM
is ambiguity averse, investment occurs earlier compared to the unambigu-
ous case, while the opposite holds if the DM is ambiguity seeking. The
explanation relies on the nature of the payo¤ structure. While waiting
involves an uncertain prospect, because the option can vanish at each
instant, investment yields a certain payo¤. When the DM is ambiguity-
averse, he dislikes the uncertainty associated with the waiting region and
prefers to invest sooner. In contrast, an ambiguity seeking DM will wait
longer to obtain a larger payo¤. As shown in Appendix 3.A.6, the result
of Proposition 3.5 does not depend on the risk attitude of the DM.
3.3 Experimental design and testable hypothe-
ses
While in the theoretical model time is continuous, in the laboratory imple-
mentation time must proceed at discrete steps. We approximate continu-
9 Indeed " enters the expressions for p+ (V ) and p  (V ).
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High exp. rate Low exp. rate 1 p
Benchmark 10% 5% 50%
Risk 11% 4% 50%
Ambiguity 10% 5% no info
Table 3.1: Parameterization for the treatments Benchmark, Risk and
Ambiguity.
ous time by setting the time interval equal to 0:1 seconds. In each interval,
the project value grows and expires according to the chosen growth and
expiration rates. To convey a clear information to the subjects, we com-
municate the growth and expiration rates per second.
To test the predictions of the model, we run three treatments named
Benchmark, Risk, and Ambiguity. In all treatments, the investment cost
C is set equal to 10 Euros, the initial value V0 is set equal to 9.8 Euros,
while the growth rate is equal to  = 0:0036 every 0:1 seconds. This is
corresponds to a growth rate equal to 3% per second.10 In the treatment
Benchmark the initial probability that the expiration rate is low is known
and equal to p = 0:5. The high expiration rate is set equal to H = 0:0105,
which means 10% per second, while the low expiration rate is L = 0:0051,
that is 5% per second. This implies that the initial expected expiration
rate is equal to 7.5% per second. In the treatment Risk we test the e¤ects
of an increase in risk. We leave the initial probability p and the growth
rate  una¤ected. Then, we set H = 0:0116, i.e., 11% per second, and
L = 0:0041, i.e., 4% per second. Therefore, the spread between high and
low expiration rates has increased, while the initial expected expiration
rate is still equal to 7.5% per second. In the treatment Ambiguity, we
test the e¤ects of ambiguity. We set H and L as in Benchmark but
do not give any information about the initial relative probability of the
expiration rate being high or low.11 A summary of the parameterization
for the three treatments is found in Table 3.1.
The choice of parameter values is driven by a number of considera-
10 If an event occurs with probability x every 0.1 seconds, it occurs with probability
y = 1  (1  x)10 every second.
11 In practice the probability that the true expiration was low in each period was
50% as in Benchmark. But this information was not communicated to the subjects.
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tions. We set the relative probability of the two states of the world equal
to 50% in the risky treatments Benchmark and Risk while we do not give
any information in the ambiguous treatment Ambiguity. This choice is to
conform to a standard version of the Ellsberg experiment, in which good
and bad outcomes in the risky urn have equal probabilities while subjects
are told nothing about the distribution of the unknown urn. Although
the task is relatively simple, subjects have to wait and just click a button
when they decide to invest, the time interval and expiration rates should
set a challenging but at the same time "comfortable" environment. For
example, the time interval should give the feeling of continuous time but
it should not be "too short". Similarly, expiration rates cannot be set
too high to give subjects su¢ cient room to wait, and the spread between
high and low expiration rates should be appreciable but not too large,
to avoid that the task of distinguishing between states of the world be-
comes trivial. Furthermore, under the chosen parameterization, the three
treatments should give su¢ ciently distinguishable theoretical predictions
for the investment trigger. For our parameter values the predicted in-
vestment trigger is 19.32 in Benchmark, and 30.53 in Risk. Notice how
a relatively small increase is risk (from 10% and 5% to 11% and 4% for
the high and low expiration rates) generates a sharp rise in the predicted
investment trigger. In Ambiguity the investment trigger depends on the
parameter  which denes DMs attitude towards ambiguity, and a com-
parison with the predicted trigger Benchmark is not readily available. To
see whether Ambiguity and Benchmark give su¢ ciently distinguishable
predictions we adopt the following strategy. We rst nd the value of 
which denes risk neutrality. For our parameterization this value is equal
to  = 0:245. Then, assuming that subjects are ambiguity averse, we
consider the investment trigger of a DM with a mild degree of ambiguity
aversion, i.e.,  = 0:5. For this value of , the predicted investment trigger
is 16.67, which is su¢ ciently lower than the trigger in Benchmark.
From Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 the next two experimental hypotheses
follow.
Hypothesis 1 The investment trigger in Risk is larger than the one in
Benchmark.
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Figure 3.2: Initial screen information.
Hypothesis 2 If subjects are ambiguity averse, the investment trigger
in Ambiguity is lower than the one in Benchmark. If subjects are
ambiguity seeking, the investment trigger in Ambiguity is larger than
the one in Benchmark.
Hypothesis 1 states that an increase in risk delays investment. If sub-
jects rationally update their beliefs, the learning mechanism outlined in
Section 3.2.3 should induce them to wait longer before investing. Hypoth-
esis 2 comes from the fact that, as shown in Proposition 3.5, the presence
of ambiguity should lead to an early exercise of the investment option if
subjects are ambiguity averse, and the other way around.
3.3.1 Procedures
Subjects played the same investment game for 30 rounds. At the beginning
of each round the computer screen shows the parameter values. In the
treatments Benchmark and Risk, the screen displays the value for H , L
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Figure 3.3: Screen display during the treatment.
and the probability that the expiration rate is high (Figure 3.2). In the
treatment Ambiguity the screen displays only the values for H and L,
without any information about the probability of the two states of the
world. By clicking the button "OK" located at the bottom-right of the
screen, the DM starts the experiment and a new screen with the values
for Vt and the cost C appears (Figure 3.3). Subjects see the project value
Vt growing according to (3.1) and decide when to exercise the investment
option by clicking the button "INVEST". Upon investing, they obtain a
payo¤ Vt   C.
The experiment was conducted at CentERLab at Tilburg University
and the experimental subjects were 55 students of Tilburg University re-
cruited by an on-line recruitment software. Since subjects played the
investment game for 30 rounds, we have a total of 1650 observations. Par-
ticipation was voluntary and no subject participated in more that one
treatment. Groups of 18 subjects participated in the treatments Bench-
mark and Risk, while 19 subjects participated in the treatment Ambiguity.
70 CHAPTER 3. WILLINGNESS TO WAIT
Subjects were paid 5 Euros as a showup fee. The experiment was pro-
grammed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Before starting the investment game, each subject played a minimum
of 20 practice rounds. In the practice rounds, subjects played the game
described in Section 3.2.1 in which the expiration rate is known. In the
treatments Benchmark and Ambiguity subjects played 10 practice rounds
with an expected expiration rate equal to 10% and 10 rounds with an ex-
pected expiration rate equal to 5%. In the treatment Risk subjects played
10 practice rounds with an expected expiration rate equal to 11% and 10
rounds with an expected expiration rate equal to 4%. By raising their
hands, subjects could call the experimenter(s) and ask for more practice
rounds.
At the beginning of each treatment instructions were read aloud. Sub-
jects were seated in isolated computer terminals. Earnings were paid at
the end of the experimental sessions. To avoid wealth e¤ects, subjects
were paid for only one of the 30 rounds. The payment round was cho-
sen at random at the end of the experiment. The average earning was
9.10 Euro, including the showup fee. Sessions lasted about fty minutes,
including reading of instructions and payment.
3.4 Results
As mentioned in Section 3.3, we set the initial project value below the
cost of investment (C = 10 and V0 = 9:8). In some cases the investment
opportunity expired when Vt < C. There were three of these "early"
expirations in Benchmark, one in Ambiguity, and none in Risk. Since
it is not rational to invest when Vt < C (and the computer program
forbids it), early expirations do not convey any information about subjects
willingness to wait. For this reason, they are dropped from our dataset.
The remaining data are right-censored. A number of investment deci-
sions are not observed because the option expires before subjects invest.
In the treatment, Benchmark there were 244 cases out of 537 (45% of
the total) in which the option expired before subjects decided to invest.












Figure 3.4: Empirical CDFs of the observed investment trigger for the
treatments Benchmark (solid line), Risk (dash-dotted) and Ambiguity
(dashed).











Figure 3.5: Product-Limit estimate of CDFs of the investment trigger for
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Figure 3.6: Product-Limit mean estimate of the investment trigger for the
treatments Benchmark, Risk and Ambiguity.
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Benchmark Risk Ambiguity
Mean  Std.Err
Pooled PL 13:59 0:15 15:68 0:20 15:29 0:15
By-subject PL 13:61 0:42 15:48 0:53 15:14 0:39
Table 3.2: Product-Limit estimate of the mean of the investment exercise trig-
ger. The Pooled PL row shows the estimate assuming i.i.d. observations. The
by-subject PL row shows the Product-Limit estimated mean across individual
subjects.
569 (54% of the total) in Ambiguity.
The analysis of the data follows the same lines as Oprea et al. (2009).
As a preliminary step, we drop the censored observations, i.e. the cases
where the option expired before subjects decided to invest, and look at
the investment pattern for the subsample of observed investment decisions.
Figure 3.4 plots the cumulative density functions (CDFs) of the empirically
observed exercise trigger. For each value of the project, the gure shows
the proportion of subjects who exercised the investment option. A shift
of the curve to the right means that, for a given value of Vt; fewer people
exercised the option and therefore implies a stronger willingness to wait.
A visual inspection of the gure immediately reveals a clear pattern. The
CDF for the treatment Risk lies to the right to the one of Benchmark,
which is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1. Also, the gure
shows that the CDF for the treatment Ambiguity is shifted to the right
compared to the one of Benchmark. According to Hypothesis 2, this is
consistent with ambiguity seeking.
The analysis conducted on the restricted sample of empirically ob-
served investment decisions may potentially convey a misleading picture.
Censored observations are also informative because subjects voluntarily
decided to wait for the project value to grow (at least) until the moment
in which the expiration occurred. This means that the restricted sample
of uncensored observations su¤ers from a downward bias. To deal with
the problem of censored data we use the Product-Limit estimator (Kaplan
and Meier (1958)), which provides a non-parametric method to estimate
the CDFs while accounting for random censoring.
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In including the right censored observations, we rst assume that ob-
servations are i.i.d. and estimate the CDFs using pooled data across sub-
jects. Then, we formally compare the pooled Product-Limit estimates for
the CDFs using the log-rank test. Product-Limit estimates of the CDFs
for the three treatments are reported in Figure 3.5. The gure conrms
the intuition suggested by the restricted sample of uncensored observa-
tions. Both risk and ambiguity delay investment. We use the log-rank
test to verify the null hypothesis of equality between CDFs. A pair wise
test rejects the null hypothesis of equality between the treatments Risk
and Benchmark, and the treatments Ambiguity and Benchmark at 1%
level of signicance (p = 0:000).
The analysis on pooled data hinges upon the i.i.d. assumption, which
implies that investment decisions are uncorrelated across subjects. If this
is not the case, and di¤erent subjects behave in a di¤erent way, the i.i.d.
assumption is violated and standard errors are likely to be underestimated.
To account for within subject dependence, we construct for each individual
a Product-Limit estimate for the average of the investment trigger. Figure
3.6 shows histograms of the by-subject means for each of the three treat-
ments. The gure reveals that, on average, subjects in the treatments
Risk and Ambiguity invest later than in Benchmark. Table 3.2 reports
means and standard errors of the investment trigger for the pooled and
by-subject data. Means in Risk and Ambiguity are larger than the esti-
mated mean in Benchmark. We apply a pair wise MannWhitney test to
compare sample means for the by-subject estimates. The null hypothesis
of equality between Benchmark and Risk and between Benchmark and
Ambiguity is rejected at 1% level of signicance (p = 0:004 and p = 0:007
respectively). Thus, the fundamental intuition of the analysis with pooled
data is conrmed.
The e¤ect of risk is consistent with the theory and supports the logic
behind the belief updating mechanism outlined in Section 3.2.2. When
the spread between high and low expiration rates widens, subjects be-
come more rapidly condent that the true expiration rate is low and they
consistently delay the exercise of the investment option. The e¤ect of
ambiguity is striking at least on two di¤erent grounds. First of all, ambi-
guity does a¤ect investment decisions. Since we adopt a between-subject
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design, this is far from being an obvious result. As showed in Fox and
Tversky (1995), ambiguity is more likely to a¤ect individual decisions
when subjects compare choices between ambiguous and non-ambiguous
environments (within-subjects comparative ignorance), but the e¤ect of
ambiguity tends to disappear in between-subject designs. This is not the
case in our experiment. Second, the delay of investment in Ambiguity
compared to Benchmark implies that subjects are more willing to face
the uncertainty associated with the continuation region in the ambiguous
scenario. This is consistent with subjects being ambiguity seeking.
From a quantitative point of view, it is worth noting that subjects
exercised the option much earlier than what predicted by the theoretical
model, at least for the treatments Benchmark and Risk where a compar-
ison is meaningful (the theoretical prediction for the trigger is 19.32 in
Benchmark, and 30.53 in Risk).12 Figures 3.4 and 3.5 reveal a remarkably
strong result. That is, there are practically no cases in which subjects
waited for the investment trigger predicted by the model. This result can
be easily explained by the fact that, while the model is solved under the
assumption of risk neutrality, subjects are risk averse. As shown in Appen-
dix 3.A.6 the e¤ect of risk aversion is indeed to induce an earlier exercise
of the investment option. The premature option exercise can also be due
a form of loss aversion. Since the investment opportunity can suddenly
disappear, subjects may be particularly cautious about waiting to get a
larger payo¤. Finally, another (not necessarily alternative) explanation
can be that, contrary to what assumed in the theoretical model, subjects
are not perfectly Bayesian and their belief respond sluggishly to observa-
tions. If this happens, the updating dynamic is slower than what dened
by (3.6). Then, subjects becomes less rapidly condent that the true state
of the world is the good one and tend to invest earlier.
In a di¤erent setting, Oprea et al. (2009) also nd that in the large
majority of the cases, subjects invest prematurely compared to the risk
neutral optimal trigger. However, Oprea et al. (2009) also show that,
in later rounds, subjects delay the exercise of the option and approach
optimality with experience. In contrast, as shown in the next section,
12 In Ambiguity the trigger depends on the ambiguity attitude and we cannot readily
compare the theoretical predictions with the empirical results.
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Rounds 1-15 Rounds 16-30
Mean  Std.Err
Benchmark 13:37 15 13:78 0:26
Risk 15:51 0:28 15:84 0:28
Ambiguity 15:45 0:23 15:13 0:21
Table 3.3: Product-Limit estimate of the mean of the investment trigger in
rounds 1-15 and 16-30.
in our data there is no evidence of an appreciable change in subjects
investment strategy over time.
3.4.1 Inter-round learning
In the theoretical model the DM holds only one option to invest and the
optimal investment rule is dened as a trigger strategy which prescribes
that investment should occur whenever V grows above a certain value. In
the experimental implementation, for data requirements, the investment
game was repeated for 30 rounds. The repetition of the investment game
raises the possibility that subjects may adopt di¤erent strategies in di¤er-
ent rounds, for example because of inter-round learning or experimenta-
tion. In our experiment, this concern is mitigated by the fact that subjects
play the same game in every round and the initial practice period should
help them to elaborate an optimal strategy. Furthermore, since subjects
are paid for only one of the 30 rounds, possible wealth e¤ects that could
alter their behavior over time are ruled out.
In this section we verify whether subjectsinvestment strategy displays
substantial changes across rounds. To begin with, for each of the three
treatments, we use pooled data and split the sample in two sub-periods.
The rst includes rounds 1 to 15, and the second rounds from 16 to 30. We
study whether there exists a di¤erence between earlier and later periods by
comparing Product-Limit estimates for the CDF in the two subsamples.13
Figure 3.7 shows that the estimated CDFs almost perfectly overlap in all
treatments, suggesting that there is no appreciable change in behavior
13Comparing the investment strategies in sub-periods 1-10 and 21-30 yields the same
results.







10 15 20 25
V


















10 15 20 25
V
rounds 1-15 rounds 16-30
Ambiguity
Figure 3.7: Product-Limit estimate of CDFs of the investment trigger for
the treatments Benchmark, Risk and Ambiguity, splitting the sample in
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Figure 3.8: Product-Limit mean estimate of the investment trigger for the
treatments Benchmark, Risk and Ambiguity, splitting the sample in two
subperiods, rounds 1-15 and 16-30.
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Benchmark
Subject Rounds 1-15 Rounds 16-30
V 95% Conf. Interval
1 12:89  14:51 12:65  12:98
2 14:52  15:55 14:21  14:95
3 12:27  13:05 11:87  13:00
4 13:11  15:14 13:32  14:63
5 17:04  18:30 17:59  19:01
6 11:46  12:35 11:67  12:54
7 12:20  12:76 12:21  12:86
8 13:44  14:53 13:35  15:14
9 11:24  11:62 11:04  11:52
10 11:34  13:34 11:95  16:72
11 12:85  16:11 11:61  12:31
12 14:91  15:46 14:74  15:78
13 13:12  15:95 15:76  21:85
14 11:24  12:37 11:46  12:45
15 11:77  11:97 12:34  12:60
16 12:01  12:81 12:12  12:96
17 11:56  12:60 11:68  13:69
18 12:60  13:65 12:39  14:60
Table 3.4: 95 percent condence interval of the Product Limit mean estimate of
the investment trigger for the treatment Benchmark in rounds 1-15 and 16-30.
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Risk
Subject Rounds 1-15 Rounds 16-30
V 95% Conf. Interval
1 16:22  19:35 16:00  18:89
2 12:41  15:63 12:19  13:53
3 13:98  15:20 13:66  12:30
4 14:75  19:51 16:90  21:41
5 13:05  14:95 11:38  12:78
6 12:62  13:78 13:71  16:45
7 17:93  21:23 18:03  22:21
8 12:64  18:34 13:28  15:51
9 12:92  13:98 12:78  16:07
10 14:81  19:33 16:61  21:92
11 13:38  14:90 13:57  14:21
12 12:43  13:91 12:21  13:36
13 13:06  14:70 13:62  15:08
14 14:05  14:91 15:48  17:64
15 12:40  13:90 13:22  14:81
16 12:13  14:29 12:36  13:69
17 16:43  21:37 15:53  18:32
18 13:68  16:82 19:03  21:74
Table 3.5: 95 percent condence interval of the Product Limit mean estimate
of the investment trigger for the treatment Risk in rounds 1-15 and 16-30.
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Ambiguity
Subject Rounds 1-15 Rounds 16-30
V 95% Conf. Interval
1 15:83  19:67 10:70  11:31
2 14:19  14:86 15:51  18:79
3 15:09  17:54 15:49  16:95
4 15:48  15:68 14:21  15:85
5 14:79  17:87 17:21  17:96
6 12:60  14:89 12:55  14:25
7 13:79  15:67 14:56  17:22
8 13:18  14:47 15:57  16:66
9 17:80  21:00 19:57  21:38
10 16:51  19:69 14:49  17:25
11 14:47  14:99 12:85  13:45
12 11:96  15:81 13:73  16:87
13 13:70  14:23 13:84  14:14
14 13:25  15:06 13:64  15:90
15 12:72  14:33 12:48  13:50
16 14:64  16:49 13:84  14:76
17 12:29  14:21 12:04  13:07
18 14:56  17:72 14:51  16:00
19 12:73  13:66 12:43  13:40
Table 3.6: 95 percent condence interval of the Product Limit mean estimate
of the investment trigger for the treatment Ambiguity in rounds 1-15 and 16-30.
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across rounds. This intuition is statistically conrmed by a log-rank test.
The null hypothesis of equality between CDFs across subsamples is not
rejected in all treatments (p-values are 0.4843 for Benchmark, 0.3970 for
Risk and 0.3423 for Ambiguity).14 Then, we construct for each individual a
Product-Limit estimate for the average of the investment trigger in the two
subperiods. Figure 3.8 plots histograms of the by-subject means for each of
the three treatments. The gure reveals a surprisingly stable investment
pattern in Benchmark. Treatments Risk and Ambiguity display a bit
more variability between subperiods but without a clear trend towards an
anticipation or a delay of investment. In fact, Table 3.3 shows that means
computed on by-subject data do not substantially di¤er across subperiods.
In all three treatments, a pair wise Mann-Whitney test does not reject
the null hypothesis of equality of means between subperiods. Also, the
main results of the previous section are conrmed. The null hypothesis of
equality of means in Benchmark and Risk and Benchmark and Ambiguity
is rejected at 1% level of signicance in both subperiods.
Finally, Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show, for each subject, the 95 percent
condence interval of the Product Limit estimate of the mean of the in-
vestment trigger in the two subperiods. In the large majority of the cases,
the estimated trigger is concentrated around the mean and the investment
strategy does not substantially change over time.
3.4.2 The e¤ect of ambiguity: robustness
According to Proposition 3.5, our data imply that subjects are ambiguity
seeking. This contrasts with the result of ambiguity aversion commonly
found in static Ellsberg-style experiments. In this section we test whether
ambiguity seeking is a robust feature of our experimental setting. To
do so, we run an additional treatment, named Mild Ambiguity, in which
we depart from the common practice to provide no information about the
probability distribution in the ambiguous scenario. In this new treatment,
we set the parameter values for the growth and expiration rates as in
14A number of randomly chosen subjects were asked at the end of the experiment
about their investment strategy. The majority of them, replied starting with "I was
aiming at...", implying that they were actually playing a trigger strategy, as predicted
by the model.
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High exp. rate Low exp. rate 1 p
Benchmark 10% 5% 50%
Mild Ambiguity 10% 5% 20%-80%
Table 3.7: Parameterization for the treatments Benchmark and Mild Ambigu-
ity.
Benchmark and Ambiguity but we tell experimental subjects that the
probability of the expiration rate being high lies somewhere in between
20% and 80%.15 According to Proposition 3.4, If subjects are ambiguity
seeking we expect the following experimental hypothesis to be conrmed
by the data.
Hypothesis 3 The investment trigger in Mild Ambiguity is larger than
the one in Benchmark.
The relevant information about the two treatments of interest for this
section is summarized in Table 3.7.
A group of 21 subjects participated inMild Ambiguity. Subjects played
20 practice rounds as in Benchmark and the investment game was repeated
for 30 rounds. This results in a total of 630 observations. There were no
cases in which the option to invest expired when Vt < C. Therefore,
no observation was dropped. In 256 cases (40% of the total) the option
expired before subjects could invest. The analysis follows the same steps
as above. First, we consider observations to be i.i.d. and estimate the
CDFs, including the censored observations, by using the Product-Limit
estimator. The estimated CDF curves are shown in Figure 3.9. The gure
shows that the CDF in Mild Ambiguity lies slightly to the right of the
one in Benchmark. A pairwise log-rank test rejects the null hypothesis
of equality between the two treatments at 10% level of signicance (p =
0:0611). We account for within subject dependence by constructing a
Product-Limit estimate for the average investment trigger of each subject.
Figure 3.10 shows histograms of the by-subject means for each of the
three treatments, while Table 3.8 reports means and standard errors of the
pooled and by-subject data. The mean in Mild Ambiguity is larger than












Figure 3.9: Product-Limit estimate of CDFs for the investment trigger for
the treatments Benchmark (solid line) and Mild Ambiguity (dash dotted).
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Figure 3.10: Product-Limit mean estimate of the investment trigger for
the treatments Benchmark and Mild Ambiguity.
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Benchmark Mild Ambiguity
Mean  Std.Err
Pooled PL 13:59 0:15 13:83  0:12
By-subject PL 13:61 0:42 13:83  0.29
Table 3.8: Product-Limit estimate of the mean of the investment trigger.
The Pooled PL row shows the estimates assuming i.i.d. observations. The
by-subjects PL row shows the Product-Limit mean estimates across individual
subjects.
the mean in Benchmark but the di¤erence is less clear-cut. A pairwise
MannWhitney test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between
means (p = 0:3553). Overall, we nd a weak conrmation of the result of
ambiguity seeking.
3.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this work we study the e¤ects of risk and ambiguity on the timing of
option exercise. We provide a theoretical and an empirical contribution.
On the theoretical side, we develop a new real options investment model
which allows studying the distinct roles of risk and ambiguity on the timing
of option exercise. The model predicts that a higher risk delays investment
in accord with the standard results from the real options theory. The e¤ect
of ambiguity depends on the attitude of the decision maker. If the decision
maker is ambiguity averse, ambiguity accelerates investment, while a delay
of investment is consistent with ambiguity seeking.
We test the model in a laboratory experiment. Experimental data show
that, when risk is higher, investment is delayed. A higher risk means a
greater upside potential for the option and implies that investment should
occur for a larger value of the underlying. In our model this result relies
on the ability of the subjects to learn from repeated observations. The
clear conrmation of the theory suggests that the updating rule proposed
in the model is a powerful learning mechanism.
Somewhat surprisingly, we nd that also ambiguity delays investment.
As the theoretical model suggests, this signals that subjects are ambiguity
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seeking.16 The delay in investment is remarkably strong when subjects do
not have any background information about the relative probability of the
two states of the world, as in the standard Ellsberg setting. However, if
subjects face a milder degree of ambiguity and have some initial, though
vague, information the e¤ect is substantially weakened. When comparing
the treatments Benchmark and Mild Ambiguity, pooled data still conrm
an ambiguity seeking attitude but no statistically signicant di¤erence is
found accounting for within subjects dependence (Table 3.7). Remarkably,
we never nd any evidence in favor of ambiguity-aversion.
To conclude, it is important to clarify what our experimental evidence
says and what it does not say about the e¤ects of ambiguity. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.4, acceleration (delay) of investment in response to
a higher degree of ambiguity is a sign of ambiguity aversion (seeking). If
subjects have an adverse attitude towards ambiguity, they are less willing
to withstand the uncertainty associated with the continuation region and
invest earlier, and the other way around. Thus, our data are interpreted
as evidence in favor of an ambiguity seeking attitude. What data do not
reveal is the underlying reason for this favorable attitude towards ambi-
guity. The purpose of our -MEU specication is limited to identify the
qualitative e¤ect of ambiguity on the timing of investment. In this per-
spective, the ambiguity coe¢ cient  should not be strictly interpreted as
the relative probability that subjects attach to the two states of the world.
Rather it should be viewed as a reduced form to capture all the possible
channels by which ambiguity potentially inuences the decision process.
For example, ambiguity seeking could emerge as an e¤ect, not specied
in the model, of the interaction between ambiguity and learning.17 Does
16Findings consistent with a non-adverse attitude towards ambiguity have already
been found in previous experiments. For example, the evidence reported in Heath
and Tversky (1991) reveals that subjects prefer ambiguous bets to risky ones when
evaluating situations in which they feel competent or knowledgeable (other examples
of non adverse attitude towards ambiguity are found in Cohen and Hansel (1959) Howell
(1971), and Ivanov (2010)). Furthermore, ambiguity seeking is found in the majority of
experiments conducted in the loss domain (for a list of references, see Wakker (2010),
Chapter 12.7).
17We assumed that both in the risk and in the ambiguous case subjects update
their belief according to Bayes rule. This means that learning proceeds at the same
speed in both scenarios. For some reasons unspecied in the model, it could be that
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ambiguity induces optimism as the "literal" interpretation of the model
suggests? Does ambiguity seeking depend on the e¤ect of ambiguity on the
learning process? Does it depend on another, yet uncovered, behavioral
mechanism? The answer to these interesting questions would require a
di¤erent experimental framework and we leave it as a challenge for future
research.
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
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Vt   C; e (r+)dt (Ft + dFt)
o
(3.21)
= max fVt   C; [1  (r + ) dt] (Ft + dFt)g : (3.22)
= max fVt   C; Ft + dFt   (r + )Ftdtg : (3.23)
The equalities derive from: denition of Ft; (3.17); dividing the problem
between investing now, time t, or postponing the investment decision at
time t + dt, (3.18); denition of Ft+dt; (3.20); approximating e rdt by
1  (r + ) dt, (3.22); eliminating terms of order higher than dt, (3.23).
In the continuation region, it holds that
(r + )Ftdt = dFt. (3.24)
The value of the investment opportunity depends of the current project
value Vt, and we rewrite it as Ft = F (Vt). Using (3.1), equation (3.24)
learning proceeds faster under ambiguity. If this is the case, subjects would become
more rapidly condent that the true expiration rate is low and would delay the exercise
the investment option.
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can be rewritten as
(r + )F (Vt) = VtF
0 (Vt) . (3.25)
The general solution of (3.26) is F (Vt) = AV

t , where  = (+ r) =. The
coe¢ cient A and the investment trigger V K are dened by the boundary
conditions
F (V K) = V

K   C (3.26)
F 0 (V K) = 1 (3.27)
Condition (3.26) is the value-matching condition and implies that at the
trigger V K the value of the option to invest equals the value of the project
minus the sunk investment cost. Condition (3.27) is the so-called smooth-
pasting condition and implies that the trigger V K is optimally chosen by
the DM. Solving the system (3.26)-(3.27) yields the solution in (3.3).
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Here we derive the expression for the investment trigger (3.10). The value
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+(1  pt) e (r+H)dt max
tt+dt
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Vt   C; pte (r+L)dt Ft+dt + (1  pt) e (r+H)dt Ft+dt
i
= max [Vt   C; pt [1  (r + L) dt] Ft+dt + (1  pt) [1  (r + H) dt]Ft+dt]
= max fVt   C; pt [1  (r + H) dt] (Ft + dFt)
+ (1  pt) [1  (r + H) dt] (Ft + dFt)g
= max fVt   C; Ft + dFt   [r + (1  pt)H + ptL]Ftdtg : (3.28)
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Equation (3.28) implies that in the continuation region Ft satises
[r + (1  pt)H + ptL]Ftdt = dFt. (3.29)
The value of the investment opportunity Ft depends on both the value
of the project Vt and the current belief pt. Thus, we rewrite it as Ft =
F (Vt; pt). However, since both Vt and pt are deterministic functions of
time, the dimensionality of the problem can be reduced to only one state
variable.
Dene t =  (pt) = pt=(1   pt). The instantaneous change in t is
given by dt = 0 (pt) dp = (H   L)tdt, which implies that
t = 0e
(H L)t, (3.30)
where 0 = p=(1 p). Solving (3.30) for time t yields t = (H   L) 1 ln(t=0).



















Finally, using the fact that pt = t=(1+t), DMs belief can be rewrit-
ten












Equation (3.33), allows us to write the option value as a function of Vt
only, F (Vt; pt) = F (Vt). Thus, equation (3.29) becomes
[r + p (Vt)L + (1  p (Vt))H ]F (Vt) = V F 0 (Vt) . (3.34)
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where B is a constant:
The investment trigger V R and the constant B are dened by the
boundary conditions:
F (V R) = V

R   C (3.36)
F 0 (V R) = 1 (3.37)
Conditions (3.36)-(3.37) have the same interpretation of (3.26)-(3.27).
Plugging (3.36) in (3.37) and rearranging yields
V R =
 (V R)
 (V R)  1
C. (3.38)
The expression for R (Vt) is given in Proposition 3.2.
Condition (3.4) ensures that there exists a unique trigger that separates
the stopping and continuation regions (see Appendix B, Chapter 3, in
Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). 
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Here we verify the e¤ects of an increase in risk on the optimal investment
trigger. An increase in risk is represented by a mean preserving spread
between H and L at the initial date, that is a rise in  = H  
L which leaves pL +(1  p)H una¤ected. Dene the function ft =
R (Vt) = (R (Vt)  1)C.
Optimality implies that the investment option is exercised whenever
Vt   ft  0. In the waiting region it holds Vt   ft < 0, while at the
investment trigger V R it holds V

R   ft = 0. Using the implicit function
theorem, the e¤ect of an increase in risk on the investment trigger can be
found as dV R=d =
@ft=@
1 @ft=@Vt , where the derivatives with respect to 
are for pL +(1  p)H held constant.
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we claim that at Vt = V R it
must hold 1   @ft=@Vt  0. Then, we prove that @ft=@ > 0, so that
dV R=d > 0.
Suppose that the initial value of the project is below the investment
trigger, V0 < V R, and the decision maker is in the waiting region, where
it holds Vt < ft. Since R (Vt) is decreasing in Vt, as Vt increases ft also
increases and the decision maker invests as soon as V R = ft. Thus, at the
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unique trigger point V R, ft crosses (or meets tangentially) the 45 degrees
line Vt from above. Thus, the slope of ft must be lower than or equal to
one, i.e., @ft=@Vt  1.
Consider, now, the sign of @ft=@. It is useful to rewrite the expres-
sion for R (Vt) as
R (Vt) = R (V0) 


(p (Vt)  p) , (3.39)














Since we are considering a mean preserving spread between H and L
at date 0, it holds by denition that @R (V0) =@ = 0. Combined with
the fact that @p (Vt) =@ > 0 and p (Vt) > 0, this implies that the sign
of @R (Vt) =@ is unambiguously negative. Since @ft=@R (Vt) < 0, it
holds that it hold that @ft=@ =
@ft=@R(Vt)
@R(Vt)=@
> 0. The claim in the
proposition follows. 
3.A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Under the -MEU specication, the DM evaluates the investment oppor-
tunity according to a convex combination  and 1    of the worst case
and best case beliefs p t and p
+
t , respectively. The value of the option to
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Rearranging gives the expression in (3.13).
In the waiting region it holds
R t + (1  )R+t

Ftdt = dFt; (3.42)
where the expressions for R t and R
+
t are given in equation (3.14).
The option value Ft depends on the three state variables Vt, p
 
t and








. As in the Appendix 3.A.2,
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we can express the probabilities p t and p
+










































= F (Vt). Equation (3.42) implies that, in the waiting
region, the value of the option satises the following ordinary di¤erential
equation:
[r + pA (Vt)L + (1  pA (Vt))H ]F (Vt) = VtF 0 (Vt) ; (3.44)



























where D is a positive constant.
The investment trigger V A and the constant D are dened by the
boundary conditions.
F (V A) = V

A   C (3.46)
F 0 (V A) = 1 (3.47)










where the expression for A (Vt) is given in Proposition 3.4.
Condition (3.4) ensures that there exists a unique trigger that separates
the stopping and continuation regions. 
3.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Dene the function gt = A (Vt) = (A (Vt)  1)C. At Vt = V A it holds
V A   gt = 0. Using the implicit function theorem, the marginal e¤ect of
a change in the ambiguity attitude on the investment trigger is given by
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dV A=d =
@gt=@
1 @gt=@Vt . Following the same argument of Appendix 3.A.3, it
can be proved that 1 @gt=@Vt  0. Furthermore, from dA (Vt) =dpA (Vt)
and dpA (Vt) =d, it follows that @gt=@ < 0. Then, dV A=d < 0 and the
claim in the proposition follows. 
3.A.6 Risk aversion
Following the standard real options approach, we analyzed the invest-
ment problem under the assumption of risk neutrality. Here we generalize
our arguments allowing for the DM being risk averse. We rst solve the
stopping problem with known expiration rate of Section 3.2.1. Then, the
reasoning is easily extended to nd the solution for the risky and am-
biguous cases with unknown expiration rate of Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
We show that the fundamental predictions of the model about the e¤ects
of risk and ambiguity on the investment timing are not a¤ected by risk
aversion.
Let us consider the setting with a known expiration rate described
in Section 3.2.1 and assume that DMs preferences are described by a
constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA): U = w1 =1  ;
where  ( > 0 and  6= 118) is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
and w is DMs "wealth". Wealth is either the nal payo¤ Vt  I, after the
investment is undertaken, or the option to invest at an optimally chosen
time in the future if the investment is yet not undertaken. We conjecture




1   : (3.49)
The function G(Vt) can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent wealth
deriving from the investment opportunity (see Miao and Wang (2007)).





1  if Vt  eV K
G(Vt)
1 
1  if Vt <
eV K (3.50)
In the continuation region, for V < V , DMs utility satises:
(r + )U (Vt) = V U
0 (Vt) : (3.51)
18For  = 1 the CRRA utility is U = ln(w).
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subject to the boundary conditions:
U
eV K = (eV K   1)1 1   ; (3.52)
U 0
eV K = (eV K   1)  : (3.53)
Conditions (3.51) and (3.52) have the same interpretation as (3.26)-(3.27).
Substituting (3.49) in (3.51) and simplifying, we obtain
(r + )
1   G(Vt) = VtG
0 (Vt) : (3.54)
Conditions (3.51) and (3.52) can be simplied to G(V K) = V

K   I and
G0(V K) = 1, respectively. Solution of (3.54) implies G(Vt) = A0V
(r+)
(1 ) ,
where A0 is a constant. Using the appropriate boundary conditions, the
investment trigger can be found as:




 (1  ) : (3.56)
From (3.55) and (3.56), it is immediate to see that risk aversion leads
to an earlier exercise of the investment option, i.e. deV K=d < 0. The
explanation is that the option value G(Vt) is decreasing in  while the
nal payo¤ is independent of risk aversion. This implies that a more risk
averse DM is less willing to withstand the uncertainty associated with the
continuation region and will exercise the investment option sooner.19
Consider, now, the risky scenario described in Section 3.2.3. DMs
utility is the same as in (3.52) where the eV K must be substituted the
appropriate (and yet to be determined) investment trigger, indicated byeV R. Following the same steps as above, it is easy to show that the option
value G(Vt) satises
r + p (Vt)L + (1  p (Vt))H
1   G (Vt) = V G
0 (Vt) , (3.57)
19This is the same result found in Miao and Wang (2007) when the nal payo¤ is
lump sum. They also show that, when the nal payo¤ is given by a ow of an uncertain
income, the result is reversed.
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under the boundary conditions to G(V K) = V

K   I and G0(V K) = 1. The
expression for p (Vt) is given in (3.33). The solution for the investment
trigger is:
eV R = R
eV R
R
eV R  1C; (3.58)
where R (Vt) = [r + p (Vt)L + (1  p (Vt))H ] = (1  ).
Analogous steps leads to the following expression for the investment
trigger of the ambiguous scenario desribed in 3.2.4:
eV A = A
eV A
A
eV A  1C; (3.59)
where A (V ) = [r + pA (Vt)L + (1  pA (Vt))H ] = (1  ) and pA (Vt) =
p  (Vt) + (1  ) p+ (Vt).
As it is easy to check, expressions (3.58) and (3.59) imply that the
degree of risk aversion  does not a¤ect comparative static conclusions
about the e¤ects of risk and ambiguity on the timing of investment.
3.B Instructions
We report the instructions for the treatment Benchmark. Instructions for
the other two treatments are analogous, and only parameter values are
changed.
3.B.1 Instructions for the investment game
You will participate in an experiment on investment decisions where,
depending on your performance, you can win a considerable amount of
money and cannot make losses.
THE EXPERIMENT
The idea of the experiment is the following. You have the opportunity
to invest in a project by paying a cost equal to 10 Euros. By investing
you win the value of the project minus the investment cost.
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The value of the project grows by 3% per second but the option to
invest can expire at a positive rate. If the option to invest expires you get
nothing.
Your have to decide when to invest.
You will not be informed about the true expiration rate. However, you
know that:
 the expiration rate can be either HIGH (10%) or LOW (5%), and
 the probability that the expiration rate is HIGH is 50%.
The investment game will be repeated for 30 rounds. The true expi-
ration rate is randomly chosen by the computer at the beginning of each
round.
SCREEN INFORMATION
At the beginning of each round the initial screen shows the value of
the HIGH expiration rate, the value of the LOW expiration rate, and the
probability that the expiration rate is HIGH. You nd a button "OK"
at bottom-right of the initial screen. When you are ready to start, click
"OK". If you click "OK" a new screen appears and the investment game
starts. In the new screen you can see the investment cost and the value
of the project that grows over time. There is a button "INVEST" at
bottom-right of the screen. When you want to invest, click "INVEST". If
you invest before the option to invest expires, a message appears to tell
you how much you win. If the option to invest expires before you invest
the message "You did not invest" appears. The initial value of the project
is lower than the cost of investment. The computer program forbids you
to make losses. If you try to invest when the value of the project is lower
than the cost, the message "You cannot invest if V alue is lower than Cost"
appears. If you have further questions, raise your hand to call one of the
experimenters.
PAYMENT
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid 5 Euros as a partici-
pation fee plus the amount of money that you win in one of the rounds.
For example, assume that the experiment lasts 4 rounds and you win 2,
0, 7 and 20 Euros in each of these rounds. If the "payment round" is the
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third, you will get 5 Euros as participation fee plus 7 Euros. The payment





Technologies in many industries are characterized by learning curves. While
producing, rms exploit a process of learning-by-doing that leads to in-
creased e¢ ciency and lower production costs in the future. Investment
in these technologies often requires substantial up-front sunk costs and
may generate losses in earlier stages. These costs are compensated by the
benets of learning and potential future prots. Whether a new technol-
ogy turns ultimately protable depends on the development of its market,
which is usually subject to substantial uncertainty. Some recent examples
of widely publicized learning investments, i.e. those that are intended to
move down the learning curve, include hybrid cars and solar photovoltaic
cells.1
This article aims to study learning investment under uncertainty. Specif-
ically, we investigate the optimal timing and scale of investment when
demand is uncertain and marginal costs decrease with cumulative pro-
duction. Whereas the literature on investment under uncertainty mainly
focuses on the optimal timing of investment, we also investigate the choice
1There is ample empirical evidence documenting the presence of learning e¤ects in
many other industries. See Wright (1936), Hirsh (1952), Webbink (1977), Zimmerman
(1982), Lieberman (1984), Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990), Gruber (1992), Bahk
and Gort (1993), Thompson (2001), and Thronton and Thompson (2001) among others.
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of optimal capacity. This approach is dictated by the fact that scale con-
siderations play a primary role in the presence of the learning curve. A
larger capacity allows a higher per-period production rate and a faster
reduction of marginal production costs.2
When the scale of investment is exible but the timing is not, we nd
that the presence of the learning curve implies that rms should invest in
a larger capacity. On the other hand, when the timing is exible but the
scale is xed, the learning curve accelerates the investment. These two
observations suggest that investment should occur early and on a large
scale to maximize the benet of learning. However, when timing and
scale of investment are simultaneously chosen, a rm faces a trade-o¤.
Investing early, that is, investing at the moment that levels of demand
or productivity are still low, implies that only small scale projects are
optimal. At the same time, a large scale investment typically requires
higher demand or productivity and entails a longer waiting time resulting
in foregone prots. Therefore, an optimal investment strategy requires
nding a balance between timing and scale that allows rms to benet
from the learning curve, but which is not too costly in the short run.
The resolution of the timing-scale trade-o¤ depends on the steepness
of the learning curve. Under slow learning, investment occurs relatively
late and on a larger scale, whereas under fast learning it occurs early and
on a smaller scale. In the latter case, rms do not need large production
rates to substantially reduce marginal costs. Hence, it is optimal to invest
soon and install a small capacity. The opposite holds under slow learning,
because then optimality implies that a rm should install a larger capacity
to reduce marginal costs su¢ ciently within a given amount of time. Given
the larger project size, investment is delayed. It turns out that, where
timing is accelerated, scale is inversely U-shaped in the steepness of the
learning curve.
To take advantage of learning benets, rms may undertake learning
investments even when current revenue rates are below costs. We show
that the optimal investment rule implies that losses at the moment of
2Capozza and Yuming (1994), Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999), and Dangl (1999) also
determine the optimal scale of investment next to the investment timing decision. In
contrast to our paper, they do not consider learning e¤ects.
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investment are accepted even for relatively at learning curves. What
matters from an economic point of view is how large accumulated losses
are before rms break even. Our analysis indicates that, rst, the present
value of expected initial losses is large. Second, the amount of initial
losses is the largest for moderate learning rates. For steep learning curves,
the initial level of losses is similar but, because of rapid learning, the
break-even point is reached sooner. Third, the losses incurred in early
production stages can easily dwarf the initial investment outlays to set
up the production facility. Overall, these ndings indicate that learning
investments can be nancially very demanding for rms. This is especially
true for technologies with intermediate learning curves.
Learning investment may be particularly exposed to downside risk.
New technologies may be superseded by newer technologies, turn out to
be unmarketable or awed. To analyze how downside risk a¤ects optimal
investment, we extend the model by introducing the possibility that the
project fails and vanishes at a random time. We show that learning in-
vestment is very sensitive to this type of risk. Investment is signicantly
delayed and scale increases with the occurrence of even small levels of
downside risk. In contrast, timing and scale of non-learning investment are
very insensitive to this type of risk. Furthermore, the value of investment
projects with learning curves is decreased more by downside risk. Inter-
estingly, the e¤ects of risk on learning investment are strong for moderate
learning curves and steeper curves do not amplify these e¤ect further. The
explanation is related to the initial losses associated with learning invest-
ment, which are similar for these cases. The threat of the project expiring
before any prots materialize, distorts learning investment and prevents
long-term benets of learning from being fully exploited.
Past theoretical research has recognized the learning curve as a key
factor behind rmsproduction policies and competitive strategies. Some
important contributions include Spence (1981), Brueckner and Raymon
(1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), Ste-
fanou, Majd and Pindyck (1989), Cabral and Riordan (1994), Dutta
and Prasad (1996), Cabral and Riordan (1997), Auerswald, Kau¤man,
Lobo, and Shell (2000), Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite
(2010). However, little attention has been paid to the e¤ects of the learn-
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ing curve on corporate investment. The closest to our work is the work
by Majd and Pindyck (1989), which studies the optimal production rate
under the learning curve and uncertain demand. In their continuous-time
model a production facility with xed capacity is given and no investment
decision is analyzed. In contrast, we study exible investment in a new
technology facility to show that the learning curve can signicantly a¤ect
the choice of investment timing and optimal capacity.
This work is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model of
investment in the presence of the learning curve, whereas Section 4.3 an-
alyzes the optimal choice of timing and scale of investment. Section 4.4
studies initial losses associated with learning investment, and Section 4.5
introduces jump downside risk and investigates its e¤ects on investment.
Finally, Section 4.6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4.2 A model of investment with the learning
curve
Time is continuous and labelled by t 2 [0;1). A rm holds an option to
develop a production facility with a technology characterized by a learn-
ing curve. The exercise of the investment option involves the decisions of
when to invest (timing) and how much capital to install (scale). To focus
on learning investment, we assume that at the initial time the rm has no
capital invested in the technology. Investment is irreversible and is asso-
ciated with a lumpy up-front cost. A unit of capital costs i, so investment
in K units of capital requires an investment expense of I(K) = iK. Once
in place, the lifetime of the production facility is assumed to be innite.
Capital at level K is used to produce output. The production technol-
ogy is characterized by constant returns to scale and each unit of capital
produces one unit of output. The rm produces at its capacity determined
by the scale of investment.3 This implies that per-period output q is equal
to the level of capital, i.e. q = K.
Each unit of output is produced at non-negative marginal costs. The
3For simplicity we do not allow for temporary suspension of the production; its role
has been studied in Majd and Pindyck (1989).
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learning curve allows the rm to decrease these costs with accumulated
experience. At each point in time, marginal costs are constant with respect
to the rate of output but, starting from an initial level c, they decline




model the learning curve we follow Majd and Pindyck (1989) and set the
instantaneous marginal cost equal to
c(Q) = ce Q; (4.1)
where  > 0 is an exogenous parameter that determines the intensity of
the learning process.4 A high (low)  means that the learning curve is
steep (at).
The rms output is non-storable and sold at a unit market price de-






Prots are discounted at rate :
We assume that the price is determined by the inverse demand func-
tion5
P = X   'q; (4.3)
where ' is a strictly positive constant, and X is a demand shift parameter




= dt+ dZt: (4.4)
The drift and the discount rate are related such that  > .6
4Whereas we assume that the marginal costs asymptotically approach zero, Majd
and Pindyck (1989) assume that the learning process stops as soon as marginal cost
reaches a strictly positive lower bound. Employing Majd and Pindycks specication
would not change our qualitative results.
5The results presented below are not driven by the model specication. In par-
ticular, all the results are also present in another popular specication in these types
of models: a price taking rm with decreasing returns to scale technology (Pt is an
exogenous di¤usion process and the rate of production with capital K is K,  < 1).
The analysis is available from the authors upon request.
6 If     0, it would be optimal to indenitely postpone the investment.
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The per-period prot can be written as a function of demand shock
X, capital stock K, and cumulative output Q:
 =
 
X   'K   ce Q

K: (4.5)
Once the capital is in place, the facility yields an expected discounted
stream of prots equal to




Xt   'K   ce Qt

Ke tdt j X0 = X; Q0 = Q

:










Note that the stream of production costs are discounted at the "learning
adjusted" rate  + K. A larger capacity implies a larger per-period
production rate, faster learning and, therefore, a lower discounted stream
of costs.
4.3 Timing and scale of learning investment
4.3.1 Benchmarks: Fixed timing and xed scale
In the model the rm simultaneously chooses timing and scale of invest-
ment. However, we initially consider two benchmark cases. In the rst,
the rm can only choose the optimal project size without the option to
delay the investment. In the second, it has the exibility to choose the
investment timing while the size is xed.
Consider the case in which the rms strategy is limited to the optimal
capacity choice. Given the market conditions X, in this scenario the rm
chooses the optimal size of investment K by solving
max
K
[V (X;K; 0)  iK] : (4.7)
The optimal capacity is implicitly determined by the standard optimality
condition that equates the marginal value of an additional unit of capital










2 = i: (4.8)
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The rst question that we want to answer is how the speed of the learning
process a¤ects the optimal size of the project when investment cannot
be delayed. That is, we want to know how  a¤ects K. Condition (4.8)
cannot be explicitly solved forK. However, we can show that the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 4.1 When the rm can choose the scale but not the timing
of investment, the scale K is increasing in .
Proposition 1 implies that a more intense learning process increases
the scale of investment. Intuitively, a larger  means a faster reduction
of the marginal costs, a larger marginal value of capital and, therefore, a
larger optimal capacity.
Consider now the case of a rm that has an option to choose the
optimal timing of investment for a project of xed size K. The rm
observes the evolution of the market conditions X and invests at time t,
where t = inf

t : X  X
	
and X is the demand level that triggers the
investment. The investment trigger X is optimally chosen by the rm.
Denote by F (X;K) the value of the option to invest. Standard ar-




2XFXX(X;K) + XFX(X;K)  F (X;K) = 0: (4.9)

































The two coe¢ cients, A(K) and B(K), are to be determined by appro-
priate boundary conditions. As X reaches zero (its absorbing state), the
investment opportunity is foregone forever and the investment option is
valueless, i.e. F (0;K) = 0. This implies that B(K) = 0. The invest-
ment trigger X(K) and the coe¢ cient A(K) are obtained from the value
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matching and smooth pasting conditions
F (X(K);K) = V (X(K);K; 0)  iK; (4.10)
FX(X(K);K) = VX(X(K);K; 0): (4.11)





























From equation (4.12) the next proposition immediately follows.
Proposition 4.2 When the rm can choose the timing but not the scale
of the investment, the investment trigger X(K) is decreasing in .
When the scale of the project is xed, a more intense learning process
accelerates the investment. This result is also intuitive. For a given ca-
pacity, a larger  implies a higher value of the project so that a lower X
is needed to induce the rm to invest.
4.3.2 Joint determination of timing and scale
Up to this point, we considered the timing and scale dimensions separately.
We showed that when the scale of the investment is exible but the timing
is not, a more intense learning process implies that a rm should invest
in a larger capacity. Also, we showed that when the timing is exible but
the scale is xed, the learning curve accelerates the investment. These
ndings may suggest that investment should occur early and on a large
scale. However, timing and scale of investment involve a trade-o¤. The
key observation is that a large scale investment is costly when investment
is early and the market is still small. On the other hand, later investment,
i.e. investing at a moment after the market has grown large, can sustain an
increased scale. Here, we bring the timing and scale dimensions together
and see how, in the presence of the leaning curve, the timing-scale trade-o¤
is optimally resolved.
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Given the timing rule dened by (4.12), the rm determines the project
scale to maximize the value of its investment option. That is, the opti-
mal capacity K maximizes (4.13). Rearranging the rst order condition,






2 = ic ; (4.14)
which implicitly denesK. It is easy to verify that a nite positive solution
for K exists if 1 > 2. Substituting the optimal capacity K in (4.12) gives
the value for the optimal investment threshold X(K), also denoted simply
by X.
A closed form expression for the optimal capacity K, and therefore for
the investment trigger X, is not available. Yet, in the Appendix we show
that, when it exists, K is uniquely determined by (4.14). Furthermore, we
show the following analytical results regarding the e¤ects of the steepness
 of the learning curve on the scale and timing of investment.
Proposition 4.3 If the rm can choose the timing and scale of learning
investment, the following holds. The optimal scale K is an inverse-U-
shaped function of . The investment trigger X is decreasing in .
Given the timing-scale trade-o¤, the rm faces two alternatives. The
rst is to benet from a large capacity at the cost of delaying investment
and entry into the market. The second is to invest and to earn prots early
but at the cost of setting a small scale production facility. Proposition 3
implies that the rst alternative is preferred if  is low while the second
is chosen if  is high. We interpret our ndings as follows.
When  is low, the learning e¤ect, although present, is weak and the
rm needs a high per-period production rate to reduce the marginal cost
at a su¢ cient speed. For this reason, the benets of a larger capacity
outweigh the costs of a delayed investment and optimality implies that in-
vestment should occur relatively late but on a large scale. On the contrary,
when  is high, the learning process is fast even with a low production
rate. Therefore, the benets of an additional unit of capital, in terms of
an increased speed of learning, are small compared to the cost of delaying
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Figure 4.1: Optimal scale and investment trigger. Parameter values are:
c = 5,  = 0:06,  = 0,  = 0:1, ' = 1, and i = 1.
the investment. For this reason, the optimal strategy is to reduce the scale
of the project and to enter the market early.
Proposition 3 says that a more intense learning process accelerates
investment, i.e. faster learning means a lower investment trigger. This
result is not obvious, because there are two opposing forces at work.
The total e¤ect of  on the investment trigger is given by dX(K)=d =
@X(K)=@ + @X(K)=@K dK=d. The rst term, always negative, is the
direct e¤ect of  on the investment trigger. The second term is the indi-
rect e¤ect of  through its inuence on the optimal capacity K. The sign
of this term is ambiguous and is positive when K increases in . Here, the
timing-scale trade-o¤ becomes clearer. Potentially, the downward e¤ect of
the learning curve on the investment trigger, meaning earlier investment,
may be more than compensated by the upward e¤ect due to the larger
capacity. In this setup the rst e¤ect is always dominant, however.
Summarizing, our ndings suggest that the following rule of thumb
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e¤ectively describes the investment strategy in the presence of the learning
curve. If the learning process is slow, invest relatively late and on a larger
scale. If the learning process is fast, invest early and on a smaller scale.
To demonstrate the quantitative e¤ect of learning on investment, we
provide a numerical example. Parameter values are set as follows. The
initial marginal cost is c = 5, the discount rate is equal to  = 0:06, the
drift parameter is set equal to  = 0, and ' = 1. Finally, the cost of one
unit of capital is i = 1.
Figure 4.1 presents the e¤ects of  on scale and timing of investment.
The dashed curve in Figure 4.1 plots K as a function of . As conrmed
in Proposition 3, the optimal capacity K is an inverse-U-shaped function.
The steep increase of K for low  has a substantial e¤ect: the scale of
investment is larger with learning than without learning up to  equal to
about 0:05. The solid curve shows that X is a monotonic and decreasing
function of . Both timing and scale can be greatly a¤ected by the learning
curve. For small learning rates, investment is late and on a large scale. For
larger learning rates, say for values of  above 0:05, investment is taken
early and on a relatively small scale.
4.4 Initial losses
In the standard real options analysis, rms invest above the break-even
point, i.e. they make (substantial) prots from the moment of investment
on. However, learning investment brings additional long-term incentives,
which may tempt the rm to accept some initial losses. This section,
therefore, tries to answer the following questions. Do rms accept some
initial losses to benet from the learning e¤ects? Provided the answer
is positive, how large are these losses compared to the initial investment
cost? Is steeper learning related to higher initial losses?
Prots or losses at the moment of investment are equal to (X  'K  
c)K. It is easy to verify that initially rms make losses when investing in
learning technologies. For our baseline parameter values, this is demon-
strated in Figure 4.2.A. The rm invests at losses already at such low
values of  as 0:015, which implies that the long-run learning incentives
are already strong even when the learning curve is relatively at. Inter-
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estingly, after some point the level of losses starts to decrease in . This
can be explained by the decreasing scale of learning investment in  (see
Figure 4.1). Very steep learning implies that the rm invests in small
capacity, so losses right after the investment time do not have to be large
to support su¢ cient learning.
Next, we focus on cumulative losses up to the time when the production
breaks even. Let us denote by L the expected present value of the stream
of losses being incurred before the rst time that per-period prots are
zero. This will measure how much more capital the rm needs to furnish
beyond the initial investment cost.
To simplify notation, at the moment of investment, reset time to t = 0.
Given the prot ow
t =
 
Xt   'K   ce Qt

K = (Xt   'K   ce Kt)K;
the break-even point is achieved at the stopping time BE = inf ft  0 : t = 0g =
infft  0 : Xt = 'K + ce Ktg. The break-even point can be denoted as
a time-dependent threshold on X; namely XBE(t) = 'K + ce Kt. Note
that t can be written as (X; t).
The value of the expected stream of losses from point (X; t) up to the
break-even point is denoted by L(X; t). At the moment of the investment
it is given by





It follows from standard arguments that L must satisfy the partial di¤er-
ential equation
L = XLX +
1
2
2X2LXX + Lt + (X; t);
It is solved subject to a boundary condition at XBE(t) where L should be
equal to zero:
L(XBE(t); t) = 0: (4.15)
This needs to be solved numerically; we apply the nite-di¤erence method.7
7Apart from (4.15), we need other boundary conditions in the (X; t) space. At the
absorbing state X = 0; we have that
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Figure 4.2: Prots at the time of investment and the present value of
initial losses as a function of learning speed . Parameter values are:
c = 5,  = 0:06,  = 0,  = 0:1, ' = 1, and i = 1.
The results for the baseline parameter values are presented in Figure
4.2.B. The solid curve plots the present value of initial cumulative losses.
This value can exceed 8:50, which happens for values of the learning rate
 around 0:08. Initial cumulative losses then decrease for higher . This
pattern originates from the non-monotonicity of instantaneous losses pre-
sented in Figure 4.2.A. However, the non-monotonic shape is much steeper
here. This is because with faster learning, the break-even point is reached
sooner and the cumulative initial losses decrease. This implies that in
terms of required nancial slack, investment in technologies with moder-
ate learning e¤ects is most demanding.
It is interesting to compare the initial cumulative losses to the initial
For t high enough, learning is almost completed so prots become independent of
cumulative output, and thus L is time-independent. The break-even point is then
XBE = 'K. L(X) must satisfy the ODE, L = XLX +
1
2
2X2LXX + (X   'K)K;
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cost of investment. The dashed curve in Figure 4.2.B plots the ratio
of these variables for di¤erent values of . It demonstrates that initial
cumulative losses can be very substantial and well exceed the initial cost
of investment. In the baseline case the ratio exceeds four and is relatively
at for  su¢ ciently large. (The at shape is caused by the decreased
scale of investment for high .)
4.5 Downside risk
The analysis so far assumed that the only source of uncertainty is the
di¤usion risk in the market demand. However, many investments and
technologies may be susceptible to downside jump risk. This may be
particularly relevant for learning investment. Frontier technologies in such
investments can be superseded by even newer technologies or may prove
to be technologically awed.
To examine the e¤ects of downside risk on learning investment, we in-
troduce the possibility that all along the time period after the investment,
with probability dt an event can occur that results in the death of the
project, where  is a positive constant. The analysis follows the same
steps as those presented in Section 4.3. Therefore, only the key steps are
highlighted here.
The value of the production facility in place is equal to the discounted
stream of prots, so that
V (X;K;Q) =
XK





+ K + 
:
Note that the di¤erence with expression (4.6) is that the discount rate is
augmented with the expiry rate . For a given capacity K; the investment
is optimally undertaken when X reaches the upper trigger X(K) given by
X(K) =
















  + 1K +  
+ K + 
2 = ic :
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Then the entry trigger equals X = X(K).
It is straightforward to derive that both X and K increase in . To
verify whether  can have quantitatively di¤erent e¤ects on learning and
non-learning investment, we use the baseline parameter values with di¤er-
ent learning rates and a range of small realistic values for  between 0 and
0:1. Figure 4.3 presents the results. The solid curve plots the values for
investment with no learning e¤ects ( = 0), the dashed curve represents
intermediate learning e¤ects ( = 0:1), and the dotted curve represents a
steep learning curve ( = 0:2).
























































































Figure 4.3: The e¤ects of downside risk at rate . The solid curve plots
 = 0, the dashed curve plots  = 0:1 and the dotted curve plots  = 0:2.
Other parameter values are: c = 5,  = 0:06,  = 0,  = 0:1, ' = 1, i = 1;
and X0 = 2.
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Figures 4.3.A and 4.3.B show that investment without learning is
rather insensitive to downside risk. The opposite is observed for learning
investment. Already for intermediate learning ( = 0:1), both timing and
scale are very sensitive to the presence of downside risk, even when this
risk is small. In fact, the e¤ects for the very steep learning curve ( = 0:2)
are not much stronger any more. These observations can be explained by
considering the amount of initial losses associated with learning invest-
ments. If investment generates losses in early stages, then an early expiry
before any long-term gains are realized is particularly costly. Because the
losses are the largest for intermediate learning curves, these investments
are relatively most sensitive.
Next, we look at the e¤ects on the value of investment in place and
on the value of the option to invest. Figure 4.3.C plots the ratio of the
value of investment in place for a range of s to the value of investment in
place for  = 0. It shows how much downside risk decreases the value of
the production facility at the moment of investment. The gure indicates
that the smaller the learning e¤ects, the more value is lost at the moment
of investment with the introduction of downside risk. This means that
learning investment has more leeway in adjusting timing and scale so that
the value at the moment of investment is not so much a¤ected. However,
this exibility comes at a cost. Figure 4.3.D plots similar ratios but of
the value of the option to invest to show how much the investment option
value is destroyed by downside risk. Figure 4.3.D takes the distortion
of the terms of investment into account, which is not reected in Figure
4.3.C. In this case, the steeper the learning curve, the more value is lost due
to downside risk. This is because learning investments are substantially
delayed, which helps to maintain the value of the project at the investment
time (Figure 4.3.C), but weakens the learning potential and destroys the
value of the option to invest (Figure 4.3.D). It is worth noting that the
di¤erence between the two learning cases with  = 0:1 and  = 0:2 are very
small, which shows again that investments in technologies with moderate
learning e¤ects are relatively most vulnerable.
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4.6 Conclusions
This work investigates optimal investment behavior in a situation where
production costs decrease over time due to learning. The rm under con-
sideration operates in an uncertain output market with uctuating de-
mand. To maximize the e¤ects of the learning curve, the rm would
invest early and on a large scale. However, such a policy is costly in the
short-run and risky. We show that, if the learning curve is at, rms
optimally invest late and on a large scale. On the other hand, when the
learning curve is steep, early and small scale investments are optimal.
We further show that learning investment is associated with large ex-
pected losses in the early stages after the rm undertook the investment.
The reason is that, due to learning, production costs reduce over time,
implying that in the beginning they are still high. The implication of the
occurrence of initial losses is that learning investment is very sensitive to
downside risk in the sense that an event can occur leading to the end of
the project at a time too early for learning to have caused su¢ cient cost
reductions. The expected losses and distortions are particularly strong for
investment with moderate learning curves.
Despite its focus on optimal rm decisions, our analysis has some clear
policy implications. Investing in technologies with very steep learning
curves, like many information technologies, can be e¢ ciently undertaken
by rms. However, investing in technologies with moderate learning curves
is more di¢ cult and more nancially demanding for rms. Frictions, for
example nancing constraints, may easily lead to suboptimal investments
in these technologies. If there are some positive externalities of techno-
logical investments, such as learning spillovers or positive environmental
e¤ects, then suboptimal investment in such technologies may be especially
costly from a welfare perspective. This category of technologies, i.e. with
moderate learning and large externalities, may include some energy tech-
nologies. In this case, public support of investment, e.g., in the form of
guaranties, may be warranted.
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4.A Appendix: Proofs
4.A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Totally di¤erentiating condition (4.6) and rearranging yields
dK=d =  VK (X;K; 0)=VKK(X;K; 0):
From (4.6),











Hence, the e¤ect of  on the optimal capacity, dK=d, is positive. 
4.A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
In the text. 
4.A.3 Optimal capacity: existence and uniqueness






















Rearranging the term between the curly brackets yields condition (4.14).
Existence of a positive nite solution to (4.14) was argued in the text and
requires that 1 > 2.
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To verify that the inequality holds, we use the rst order condition. Note
that, because the rst three terms between the curly brackets of (4.16) are






2 > 0: (4.18)
Using (4.18) and 1 > 2 in the left hand side of (4.17), we conrm the
inequality in (4.17). Given that F (X;K) is a continuous and smooth
function, local concavity at the stationary points implies that the station-
ary point is unique. Hence, K (when it exists) is unique and maximizes
F (X;K). 
4.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
The e¤ect of  on the optimal capacity is given by
dK=d =  FK(X;K)=FKK(X;K):










3  (1   2)  1K :
(4.19)
Recalling that FKK(X;K) < 0, the optimal capacity increases in  when
FK(X;K) > 0 and decreases otherwise. The sign of FK(X;K) is
identical to the sign of the term between the square brackets. Dene
 () =  (1   2) 1K: The optimal capacity K is an inverse-U-shaped
function of  as claimed in the proposition if  () > 0 for low values of
,  () < 0 for high values of  and if there is only one value of  which
satises  () = 0.
Assume that (4.14) holds and that 2 > 2 so that a nite positive
solution for K exists. When  is small, given that lim
!0
K is bounded,
 () is positive. Assume, now, that K is always increasing in . This
assumption requires that   () > 0 for every combination of  and K.
But given that  (1   2) is constant, for su¢ ciently large values of , it
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must be that   () < 0, contradicting the initial hypothesis. Hence, for
large values of  there exists a region where dK=d < 0, i.e.   () < 0.
Finally, we show that  () changes its sign only once with increasing
. Di¤erentiating   () with respect to  yields
 0 () =  1K   1dK=d, (4.20)
which is negative if dK=d  0, that is if   ()  0. It follows that there
exists only one value of  that satises   () = 0.

































2 > 0 implies that the term between the square
brackets in the denominator is always positive. This, together with 2 > 2
and  > ; yields that dX=d < 0. 
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